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ABSTRACT 
Many firms hit by the Asia financial crisis of 1997-8 are in the process of turning 
themselves around. Despite the recent surge of interest in this issue, company turnaround in 
most East Asian countries is not well understood as yet. The extant theory of turnaround is 
based largely on the Anglo-American experience of which actions best increase efficiency 
and maximize shareholder return. The purpose of this thesis is to apply this strand of research 
to the East Asian setting; thus systematically studying the differences and similarities 
between turnaround actions undertaken by East Asian firms and U.S. firms through the lens 
of institutional theory. The institutional environment in East Asia encourages the legitimacy 
building of controlling families and their key guanxi networks, which can have enormous 
implications for turnaround actions undertaken. Testable hypotheses were proposed and a 
two-phase research design that combines quantitative (archival sources) and qualitative 
(interviews) data was utilized. The empirical data consist of financial information about 312 
firms in Hong Kong, Singapore and the U.S. and 12 in-depth interviews with senior 
management and turnaround specialists in East Asia. The quantitative part of the study found 
that increased sales efforts were negatively associated with firm performance, and the 
magnitude of the relationship was stronger among U.S. firms than among East Asian firms. 
No discemable region-effects was found among East Asian firms and North American firms 
on making management changes and undertaking other operational turnaround actions such 
as reducing assets, reducing accounts receivable and lowering debt. The qualitative data 
gathered suggest that institutional forces have subtle effects on how firms undertake a 
turnaround in East Asia in terms of both strategic and operational aspects. The findings are 
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Researchers have long been preoccupied with organizational growth and its 
consequences, while under-researching the important and ultimately unavoidable concern of 
organizations -- organizational decline (Peng & Heath, 1996; Whetten, 1980). Pearce and 
Robbins (1993) commented that the number of studies investigating organizational growth 
through mergers and acquisitions, vertical integration, and strategic alliances far outnumber 
the research efforts that seek a better understanding of the increasing prevalent cases of 
business downturn (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Hence, effecting firm rescue and turnaround, 
an issue of paramount importance in strategic management literature (Rumelt, Schendel & 
Teece, 1994) and of enormous social and economic benefits to offer (Harker & Sharma, 
1999) has largely been neglected. As a consequence, the study of business level turnaround is 
"tenuous, without a unifying theory to guide its advancement" (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). 
Turnaround research was first broached in the 1970s in response to economic 
recession in the U.S. and Europe (e.g. Schendal, Pattern & Riggs, 1976). A body of research 
has started to develop concerning the actions that produce successful firm turnarounds in the 
U.S (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bmton, Oviatt & White, 1994; Davis, 1993; Slatter, 1984). In 
the late 1990s, it started to receive renewed attention as a prodigious number of firms in East 
Asia were heavily hit by the 1997 turmoil and faced extended downturn (Clifford & 
Engardio, 2000).^ Business researchers have started to investigate the avenues for East Asian 
firms in distress to right themselves (Ang, Lee, Lim, Singh & Tan, 2000; Bmton, Ahlstrom & 
Wan, 2001; Singh & Yip, 2000). Research on turnarounds outside the U.S., as with many 
1 In this study, the term East Asia refers to countries located in the East Asian region: Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea, but excluding China and Japan. It is arguable whether Singapore should be 
considered part of East Asia or Southeast Asia, but business press also refers it as in East Asia (see The 
Economist, 2001). 
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organizational management topics, has yet to occur to a substantial degree (Boyacigiller & 
Adler, 1991; Bmton et al., 2001). This resurgence of research interest in better understanding 
firm turnaround has much potential to offer far-reaching implications to organizations and 
policymakers alike (Ang et al., 2000). It is unclear the degree to which such research done in 
the West will have any bearing on the Overseas Chinese firms in East Asia. Western-made 
theory cannot always explain patterns in organizational responses to turnaround situations in 
Asian contexts (Ang et al., 2000; Boisot & Child, 1988, 1996). 
The Thai Petrochemical Industries Inc. (TPI) case provides a stark illustration of the 
bounded nature of Western-made turnaround theory. TPI is a major industrial conglomerate 
based in Thailand, and founded by an Overseas Chinese businessman named Prachai 
Leophairatana. TPI was Thailand's biggest defaulter on US $3.5 billion of debt. Mr. Prachai 
Leophairatana, the chief executive, has maneuvered to stay in charge, despite the 
innumerable attempts by firm creditors to oust him and an historic court-ordered restructuring 
and upholding of Thailand's new bankruptcy laws (Frank, 2001; Rohwer, 2000; Young & 
Chan, 2001). This is in sharp contrast to the common practices in Corporate America in 
which organizations in serious crises often accuse their top managers as the culprits and 
remove them as a way to signal the organizations' determination to turn the firm around for 
their stakeholders (Colvin, 2001). This gives one illustration how Western-based turnaround 
theory cannot easily explain patterns in organizational responses to turnaround situations in 
Asian contexts, given intervention of unique contextual components in the decision making 
process of managers in a turnaround situation (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991; Child, 2000; 
Redding, 1990; Singh & Yip, 2000; Weidenbaum, 1996). Thus, there is clearly a growing 
need for comprehensive analysis of turnaround in East Asia. Central to this study is how 
turnaround differs between firms in the U.S. and East Asia. 
2 The term Overseas Chinese is used in this study as an umbrella term to refer to those residents in East Asia of 
ethnic Chinese origins. 
2 
Institutional theory offers some pertinent explanations as to how and why the 
turnaround actions taken by East Asian firms differ from those of their Western counterparts 
(Bruton et al., 2001). The core idea of institutional theory is that organizations are shaped by 
the institutional environment in which they are located, rather than simply as tools structured 
for effective or efficient work (Donaldson, 1995). The institutional framework of a society 
serves as constraints to regulate economic activities by providing the rules of the game 
(North, 1990). Institutional forces include socio-political aspects and cognitive elements that 
can influence firms and individuals. Managers operating within institutional boundaries find 
themselves subject to social meanings that encourage them to conform to a series of 
recognized and established beliefs about what actions can be undertaken. They select certain 
actions not simply because they are the most efficient or prove best to the organization, but 
because conformance confers legitimacy (Ahlstrom, 1996; Scott, 1991, 1995a). 
Organizations and individuals are granted legitimacy by utilizing correct structures and 
procedures, not only for the quantity or efficiency of their output (Ahlstrom, 1996; DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Scott, 1992, 1995a). They are structurally determined by the constraints 
posed by technical activities, and decreasingly held together by output controls (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). 
This observation suggests that purely financial considerations are too simplistic an 
explanation to the turnaround actions taken by firms in East Asia (Ang et al., 2000). The 
central thesis developed here is that turnaround responses in East Asia are embedded in and 
shaped by distinct institutional contexts (Granovetter，1985; Orru, Biggart & Hamilton, 
1997), and this in turn leads to managers' different perceptions of the challenges confronted 
by their organizations and thus the subsequent strategic choices of the turnaround actions 
(Bruton et al., 2001; Child, 2000). Therefore, a multinational comparison of turnaround 
efforts offers fascinating grounds to refine and test existing theory, and has enormous 
implications to offer to East Asian firms that are in their troughs. 
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This thesis is a response to the call for continued effort to better understand how East 
Asian firms have successfully turned around and to examine the consistency of turnaround 
activities across multiple nations in East Asia (Bruton et al.，2001). More specifically, this 
thesis poses and endeavors to answer three key questions. First, how do turnarounds in East 
Asia differ from those in the U.S.? Second, how do successful turnarounds differ from 
unsuccessful turnarounds in the East Asian region? Third, how did East Asian firms respond 
to the Asian economic crisis of 1997-8? This study continues the line of inquiry into the 
debate as to whether "American-made" theories have applicability in the Asian contexts 
(Boisot & Child, 1988, 1996; Bruton et al., 2001; Donaldson, 1995; Peng, 2000; Peng & 
Heath, 1996), and thus tests the boundaries of such theories (Child, 2000; Doktor, Tung & 
Von Glinow, 1991; Shenkar & Von Glinow, 1994). Thus, this thesis advances this stream of 
turnaround research beyond a single country setting. 
The remainder of the thesis begins with a review of extant literature on turnaround in 
the West, done primarily from the organizational efficiency perspective. Second, the 
institutional and regulatory environment of East Asia in general and Hong Kong and 
Singapore in particular were reviewed. Following North (1990), this thesis explores the 
interaction between institutions and organizations as well as the resultant strategic choices. 
The following section introduces the institutional frameworks present in Overseas Chinese 
communities, highlighting both formal and informal constraints. A set of hypotheses with 
regard to turnaround actions was formulated. Third, the thesis presents a research plan that 
combines both quantitative and qualitative methods that aimed at empirically testing this 
model. Fourth, the findings of the quantitative and qualitative investigations were presented, 
with representative quotes presented in a narrative fashion. The contributions, implications 




This chapter reviews the extant literature on firm turnaround, organized into the time 
sequence of the processes involved in a typical turnaround. The turnaround story of Hong 
Kong-based Cathay Pacific Airways is used as a running example throughout this chapter to 
illustrate the various stages and actions of a typical firm turnaround. This running example 
helps to illustrate that the current literature on turnaround, which is mostly based on Western 
turnaround experience, largely neglects the contextual elements that are constraining the 
actions in East Asia. 
Definitions of Turnaround 
In the late 1970s, several organization theorists in the U.S. and the U.K. initiated 
research on the ways firms reversed survival-threatening performance declines. A potential 
turnaround situation exists when a firm encounters multiple years of declining financial 
performance subsequent to a period of reasonable performance (Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Schendel, Patton, & Riggs, 1976; Zammuto & 
Cameron, 1985). The most visible symptom is the financial adversity as indicated in financial 
reports. The process in which the firm is able to reverse performance decline and match or 
even exceed their prosperous periods of pre-downtum performance is called a turnaround 
(Bruton and Rubanik, 1997; Pearce and Robbins, 1993; Schendel et al., 1976). A firm can 
turnaround in a year, although a typical turnaround can take longer (Bibeault, 1982). 
A typical example of turnaround in East Asia is Cathay Pacific Airways, which has 
been one of Asia's top two airlines for many years (Westlake, 1999). Cathay is headquartered 
in Hong Kong and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange but controlled by Swire Group, 
a U.K.-domiciled conglomerate. With its strong British links, Cathay yet faces many of the 
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challenges that are commonly posed to East Asian firms. One Asia's highest fliers, which 
made a record HK$3.81 billion (US$488.5 million) profit in 1996, in 1998 Cathay lost money 
for the first time in 35 years. Cathay moved rapidly to try to pull itself out of its tailspin and 
undertook a number of actions to effect a return to profitability. 
Drawing on evidence from firms in the Anglo-American institutional environment, 
the existing turnaround model depicts the inter-relationships between causes and severity of 
the turnaround situation, and between the retrenchment and recovery stages of the turnaround 
response (Pearce & Robbins, 1993). Figure 1 depicts the relationship between causes, 
situation severity, retrenchment and recovery. 
Causes of Firm Decline 
The causes of the turnaround situation have been commonly dichotomized into 
operational or internal causes and strategic or external causes (Schendel & Patton, 1976; 
Schendel et al.，1976). Downturns that resulted from poor operations or poor implementation 
of an otherwise sound strategy are called operational in nature. Typical internal factors are 
production bottlenecks, labor strife, and high materials costs or shortages, etc. Downturns that 
stem from confused strategy or failure to align its strategies to external changes are strategic 
in nature. Typical external factors are obsolete products and intense price competition. This 
classification is widely adopted by academia and industry as well (cf. Goldston, 1992; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Turnaround situations can be solely caused by internal factors or 
external factors or a combination of both and may be the result of years or gradual slowdown 








































































































































































































































































































In Cathay's case, internal factors as well as external influences both played a part in 
its downturn. Table 1 summarizes Cathay's internal causes and external causes of decline. 
Internal factors such as high wage costs have long loomed as a problem and attempts to trim 
the wage bill have resulted in labor disputes. An airline analyst reckoned that Cathay's pilots 
were (and are) clearly overpaid by industry standards, a legacy of the colonial days on which 
high salaries were paid to attract foreign pilots and increased regularly every year (Westlake, 
1999). The management has been criticized for its clumsy efforts to cut costs that have hurt 
relations with staff. Cathay's move to the new Chek Lap Kok airport imposed another burden 
as landing fees which are more than double those at the old airport, are among the highest in 
Asia. 
Table 1. Cathay's Internal and External Causes of Decline 
Internal (Operating) Causes External (Strategic) Causes  
• Regular labor strife and work • Economic recession 
slowdown • Hong Kong's Handover to the PRC 
• High landing fees as a result of • Strong Hong Kong Currency 
relocating to the new airport • Intense price competition 
• High costs  
The regional recession is the external factor that played the largest part in Cathay's 
downturn. The return of Hong Kong to China and the fact that the Hong Kong dollar 
remained strong as other currencies depreciated since mid-1997 has made its already-high 
costs even worse. These together with fierce competition from other airlines such as 
Singapore Airlines and Cathay's confused positioning have created a recipe for Cathay's 
downturn. 
Severity of the Situation 
The second component in assessing a turnaround situation is the severity of the firm 
decline. Situation severity refers to the immediacy of the threats to company survival posed 
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by the performance decline (Altman, 1968, 1982; Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993). In a low to moderately severe situation a firm may experience months or 
years of declining sales or profits; in a highly severe turnaround situation, the firm may face 
the threat of imminent bankruptcy. Perhaps the best-known measure of a severe firm situation 
in financial terms is Altman's Z score (1968, 1982). It was adopted as an objective measure 
of how close the firm was to financial insolvency (cf. Robbins & Pearce, 1992), that is, the 
threats of imminent bankruptcy or portents of business failure. Using five financial ratios and 
linear discriminant analysis to classify firms as solvent or insolvent, Altman (1968) originally 
proposed that Z scores can be used for credit evaluation, internal control considerations, and 
investment decision making, predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy in the near term.4 It was 
then adopted by some turnaround researchers to operationalize the severity of turnaround 
situation (e.g. Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Situation severity has been discussed in context with 
retrenchment responses research (Bibeault, 1982; Hofer, 1980; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992). The severity of a turnaround situation tends to predispose the 
appropriate retrenchment strategies (Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). The available 
empirical evidence suggests the severity of the firm's financial decline has a significant 
influence (a moderating effect) on the relationship between retrenchment and performance ~ 
the more severe the downturn, the more drastic the cost and asset reductions the firm is likely 
to undertake in its retrenchment plan (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). A more drastic retrenchment 
is also correlated with a bigger improvement in performance. Firms in danger of bankruptcy 
or failure (i.e., the severe situation) are able to achieve stability, i.e., a halting of the decline, 
through drastic cost and asset reductions. Firms in less severe situations have achieved short-
term stability merely through cost retrenchment (Davis, 1993). 
3 A financial insolvent condition is a state in which the firm is unable to pay all its debts or meet all financial 
responsibilities, i.e., in a state of imminent bankruptcy. 
4 The prediction is extremely accurate when using data from two years prior to potential bankruptcy (Altman, 
1968). 
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Cathay is illustrative of how the severity of the situation can influence the subsequent 
turnaround efforts. Cathay was among those airlines that were most heavily hit by the Asian 
economic crisis in 1997-8. Traffic fell 60% from Japan during the crisis (Clifford, 1997). For 
its first half year in 1998, Cathay recorded its first-ever loss, of HK $ 175 million (US $ 22 
million) as compared with a profit of over HK $ 1 billion the year before. Its share price also 
dropped by 60% in July 1997 with net profit falling 35% (Clifford, 1997). Other Asian 
airlines facing the same problem desperately tried to sell aircraft, terminate leases, cancel or 
delay orders and drop routes. Moreover, carriers were so desperate to fill seats that they made 
special offers, such as Cathay's "buy one seat, get another free" deal. This boosted the 
number of travellers, but harmed profit margins. Cathay's first-half loss was caused partly by 
a 17% fall in yields per passenger {The Economist, 1998). 
To summarize, a potential turnaround situation exists when a firm encounters multiple 
years of performance decline after a period of relative prosperity (Davis, 1993). The process 
by which a firm is able to reverse a performance decline and match or even exceed previous 
prosperous periods of pre-downtum performance is called a turnaround. Both researchers and 
workout specialists from the West have developed a body of work on how a turnaround 
should be undertaken (Davis, 1993; Schendel et a l , 1976; Slatter, 1984). 
A Western Perspective on Turnaround Responses 
The Western perspective regards a turnaround as typically accomplished through a 
broad two-phase process ~ retrenchment and recovery (Bibeault, 1982; Goodman, 1982; 
Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce, 1992; Slatter, 1984; Sloma, 1985). This 
perspective is derived from the organizational efficiency perspective, which focuses on how 
to get the costs down and boost performance, without taking into consideration the many 
social and institutional components as contextual factors affecting turnaround success in 
many countries (cf. Child, 1972，2000). 
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The first stage represents a retrenchment process that involves an emergency plan to 
halt the firm's financial haemorrhaging coupled with a stabilization plan to streamline and 
improve core operations, directed toward the primary objectives of survival and achievement 
of a positive cash flow. The means to achieve these objectives encompass the classic 
retrenchment activities: liquidation, divestment, product elimination, reducing head count, 
shutting down unprofitable locations, and pulling back from unprofitable markets. The aim is 
to gain control of the firm's cash flow (Bmton & Rubanik, 1997). 
The second stage is a recovery process that involved a retum-to-profitability-and-
growth strategy; it shifts toward objectives of growth and development, and growth in market 
share (Robbins and Pearce, 1992). The firm seeks to compete in a new manner in its existing 
industry or to enter new industries (Bmton & Rubanik, 1997). The means employed for 
achieving these objectives include new products, entering new markets, acquisitions, 
increased market penetration, and new positioning for existing products (Davis, 1993; 
Goldston, 1992; Schendel et al , 1976; Slatter, 1984). 
Retrenchment as the Initial Stage 
Most researchers who have studied retrenchment agree that retrenchment represents 
the initial stage in an overall turnaround process, lasting on average six months to two years 
(Slatter, 1984). Retrenchment can be further dichotomised into cost retrenchment and asset 
retrenchment: the former is operationalized as the net reduction in total costs (selling, 
general, and administrative, interest, and miscellaneous) and the latter as net reduction in 
long-term and short-term assets (cash and cash equivalents, accounts receivable, inventory, 
plant and equipment) (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Hofer, 1980; O'Neill, 1986; Pearce & 
Robbins, 1993; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Retrenchment is an integral component of 
successful turnaround strategies (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). The primary objective of the 
retrenchment phase is to stabilize the firm's financial condition (Bibeault, 1982; Sloma, 
1985), or using a practitioner term, “to stop the bleeding", that is, to cut the financial loss 
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from which the firm is suffering. Robbins and Pearce (1992) found that the primary 
determinant of an appropriate retrenchment response was the severity of the turnaround 
situation (Robbins & Pearce, 1992). It is a moderating variable between retrenchment and 
performance improvement. Empirical evidence shows a highly significant relationship 
between the degree of both asset and cost retrenchment and performance for firms in more 
severe turnaround situations. Yet this relationship was not present for firms that experienced 
less severe turnaround situations (cf. Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
Retrenchment was observable as both an initial stage in the turnaround process and as 
a grand strategy adopted by firms in the recovery stage (Robbins & Pearce，1992), though the 
cutting point is extremely arbitrary. Thus, retrenchment can be a major component of 
strategic or operational turnaround actions or a combination of both. To avoid inconsistent 
terminology, however, this thesis restricts the use of the term retrenchment to an initial stage 
of the turnaround process, which is aimed to restore a firm to stability. When it is used as a 
grand strategy in the second stage ~ an integral part in the operational / strategic dichotomy ~ 
the terms reduction in asset and reduction in cost are used instead of the term retrenchment. 
Cathay's many measures in the post-downturn period were typical examples of 
retrenchment efforts according to the Western turnaround literature. One of Cathay Pacific's 
retrenchment efforts was to reduce assets. Cathay rationalized its fleet, dumping all but one of 
its 13 older 747 aircraft because they were too expensive to operate. All of them were written 
down to residual value in the books, bringing HK $ 837 million in exceptional provisions to 
Cathay's 1998 accounts. With other exceptional charges, this turned a HK $ 397 million 
operating profit into a declared loss of HK $ 542 million. Most of these aircraft have since 
leased or sold to other airlines. 
Another retrenchment effort Cathay took was to reduce costs. The airline fired 1,000 
ground staff during 1998 to trim its wage bill; cabin-staff benefits were also whittled down in 
December. It downsized about 25% of its ground staff ~ half through attrition, half through 
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redundancy and retirements (Westlake, 1999). Cathay pilots were forced to accept cuts in 
salary and benefits or be fired. Angry at the compliance forced upon them, a large number of 
pilots called in sick to protest and their standoff lasted for 12 days. After mediation, the pilots 
agreed to a settlement that said would save the firm HK $ 1.4 billion (US $ 180 million) over 
the coming decade -- an annual saving of 0.53% of its operating costs for 1998. The airline 
succeeded in reducing salaries but paid for it in disrupted business, while the pilots lost a 
chunk of their income in exchange for stock options. Continued labor strife at Cathay is a 
legacy of these events. 
Cathay also cut the peripheral in-flight services to hold down costs. Managers 
squeezed costs on everything from toothpicks to jet fuel, the latter of which costs the airline 
US $ 650 million a year (Clifford, 1997). This measure led to a noticeable slide in standard of 
service and impacted the airline's reputation. It received passenger complaints that they were 
no longer given a choice of meals in economy class or offered alcohol refills, and business-
class passengers on the hop from Hong Kong to Taipei now get noodles instead of fancy cold 
cuts, for example. 
Another move Cathay did to control costs was to relocate operations to cheaper cities. 
Many accounting functions are now done in Guangzhou, the main computer center is located 
in Sydney, and reservations are largely handled out of Bombay. In addition, about 350 of the 
airline's 1,350 pilots were moved to bases overseas where they do not receive housing and 
the other substantial allowances given to staff to Hong Kong (Westlake, 1999). 
Recovery as the Advanced Stage 
Similar to causes of firm decline, recovery responses have also been commonly 
dichotomized into operational (internal) and strategic (external) in nature (Schendel et al., 
1976). The operational approach is heavily weighted toward efficiency maintenance 
strategies, such as cost cutting and asset reduction. The operating aspect of turnaround has 
much empirical substantiation (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). Hambrick and Schecter (1983) 
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found that asset/cost surgery such as significant reduction in R&D, marketing, receivables 
and inventories; significant declines in plant and equipment newness resulted in immediate 
profit improvement with no impairment to market position. They found that selective 
product/market pruning, which includes increases in relative prices, direct costs, and product 
quality, decreased marketing expenses and inventory expenses, reduced receivables, decline 
in capacity utilization, increase in employee productivity, resulted in significant profit 
improvement. 
In contrast, the strategic approach consists of the more strategic aspect of turnaround 
responses such as entrepreneurial revenue-generating, product/market refocusing initiatives. 
Product line or firm repositioning can also play a major role in a turnaround effort (Davis, 
1993; Fombmn, 1996; Goldston, 1992). The well-known cases of Burger King's and Revell's 
(top maker of toys and hobby kits) repositioning represent examples of this emphasis. For 
example, in the late 1980s, Burger King has fallen on hard times. A series of advertising 
campaigns had flopped and the film was in decline (Ries & Trout, 1993). A number of 
strategic measures included once again positioning Burger King as better tasting alternative 
to McDonald's and refining the product line to fit that strategy was launched. Top 
management was changed and the firm sold. In addition, Burger King pulled out of a number 
of marginal international markets where their market share was low (Gibbons, 1999). The 
repositioning was slow and painful, but proved successful. Price cuts facilitated increased 
market share in key competitive markets. Leading model car maker Revell made similar 
repositioning moves to rebuild a venerable brand. This led to a cut in business lines and 
change of focus (Goldston, 1992; cf. Ong & Porter, 1988). Table 2 summarizes the typical 
operational and strategic actions in the recovery phase. 
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Table 2. Typical Actions in the Recovery Phase ~ Operating and Strategic Responses 
Operating Responses Strategic Responses  
(1) Cost cutting (1) Change in management 
• Significant reduction in receivables • Removal of top managers 
• Significant reduction in debts 
• Significant reduction in R&D, marketing, (2) Product/market refocusing 
and inventories expenses • Acquisitions 
• Cut head count • New products 
• New markets 
(2) Asset reduction 
• Sales of fixed assets (3) Revenue generating 
• Significant decline in plant and equipment • Increased sales 
newness • Increased market penetration 
Causes of decline as precursors to appropriate recovery responses 
One factor that affects the choice of appropriate turnaround strategies in the recovery 
stage is the primary cause of decline (Hofer, 1980; Schendel et al., 1976; Smart & Vertinsky, 
1984) ~ the strategic-operating contingency. Schendel and colleagues (1976) introduced the 
cause of the turnaround situation into assessing the appropriateness of subsequent recovery 
strategies ~ operational cures should be used for downturns that result from poor operating 
efficiency whereas strategic cures should be adopted for downturns that stem from poor 
strategy as aforementioned. In Hambrick and Schecter's (1983: 232) words, operating 
turnarounds are “doing thing differently" and strategic turnarounds are "doing different 
things". For firms that face decline primarily as a result of external problems such as change 
in government regulations, or threat of new competitors, turnaround has often been achieved 
through a redesign in the central core of businesses such as adapting new manufacturing 
methods, establishing new distribution channels, designing new organizational structure, or 
acquiring companies with the competencies the firm covets. For firms that declined primarily 
as a result of internal problems such as production bottleneck, obsolete products, and labor 
strife, turnaround has been most frequently achieved through recovery responses that were 
heavily weighted toward improving efficiency, that is, cost/asset surgery. The recognition of 
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a relationship between cause of decline and turnaround response received strong empirical 
support (e.g. Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Robbins and Pearce (1992) also added 
that firms that undertook remedial actions against internal problems were more successful in 
achieving turnaround. 
Competitive positions as contextual factors 
Another factor that affects the choice of appropriate turnaround responses is a firm's 
competitive position. O'Neill (1986) investigated the effectiveness of four primary 
turnaround strategies ~ management, cutback, growth, and restructuring ~ in different 
contexts, that is, the firms' competitive positions. Management strategies are actions that 
"involve a change in top management personnel, or are enacted personally by the top 
management team" (O'Neill, 1986: 81). A switch in chief executives is one of those actions. 
Cutback strategies are actions that are taken to stem further decline such as replacing losing 
subsidiaries, installing financial and expense controls, costs cutting and inventory write-offs 
(O'Neill, 1986) ~ what the managers called "stop the bleeding". Growth strategies are 
actions that are designed to drive the firm ahead which includes actions such as entering a 
new product market, installing new product promotion methods and making acquisitions 
(O'Neill, 1986). Restructuring strategies are actions that involve redesigns in the core of the 
business such as adapting new manufacturing methods, establishing new distribution 
methods, and designing new organizational structures (O'Neill, 1986). O'Neill's (1986) 
model correctly predicted a positive relationship between cutback and restructuring strategies 
under weak strategic postures and a negative relationship between growth strategies and 
turnaround success under strong competitive pressures. 
Cathay's recovery strategies have included four revenue-generating strategies. First, 
it has tried hard to profit from the China market, a key source of customers, though it does 
not have passenger service there. It is trying to better integrate its schedules with the Hong 
Kong-based Dragonair, of which it owns 19%, as well as with other China-based airlines 
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such as Air China and China Southern Airlines. Second, Cathay has improved services to the 
booming U.S. market. With newly planned nonstop flights from the east coast of North 
America to Asia, plus the existing routes, Cathay now has access to 85% of the North 
American market. Third, Cathay has started to serve new destinations. They also plan more 
flights on routes to the Middle East and India as well as unspecified new destinations. Fourth, 
feeling the pressure of Star Alliance's presence in Hong Kong and with the hopes to enlarge 
the route network and increase business, Cathay participates in the "Oneworld" alliance with 
four other airlines ~ British Airways, Qantas, American Airlines, and Canadian Airlines ~ to 
feed each other's routes. Strategic partnerships are regarded as integral to an airline's 
strategic development. In this global alliance, Cathay is expected to act as the regional hub in 
Asia. Through the combined strengths allied airlines can bring joint frequent-flyer programs, 
share premium services such as lounges, code-sharing and corporate sales deals. Non-allied 
airlines are being squeezed out. Thus, this move has both strategic and operational elements 
to it. 
Strategically, global alliances give members added marketing strengths. They offer 
passengers a seamless route network that enables them to complete a journey on several 
airlines using one ticket. More airline lounges become available to their clients; and 
corporations can count on them to provide a more complete travel service. Those benefits 
help to increase alliance members' revenues. The airlines can also expect to further enhance 
their competitiveness by combining their buying power to reduce costs, be it for new aircraft 
or equipment. Operationally, they can shed excess capacity by combining routes. One 
industry executive pointed out the potentially enormous savings from having two or more 
airlines share an underused long-haul route: they can save about $100 million a year in 
operating costs while enjoying the same revenues if they can stop flying two wide-bodied 
aircraft on that route by filling seats in other planes (Bickers, 1998). As Asia is still beset by 
too much capacity, the ability for airlines to raise fares is limited. One turnaround tactic not 
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easily available to Cathay is a fare hike, especially when the big numbers of customers are 
price conscious Chinese passengers who go for discounted tickets and cheaper tours. The 
airlines is stressing once rare discounts ~ two round trips from New York or Los Angeles, 
plus five night in a Hong Kong hotel came to US$ 999 in late 1997 (Clifford, 1997). 
Change in Leadership as a Turnaround Action 
In addition to strategic and operating solutions, researchers in upper-echelons theory 
argue that chief executive officers (CEOs) can have significant impact on strategic choices 
and the ultimate performance of firms (Bmton et al.，2001; Collins, 2001; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990). 
Bibeault (1982) was the first to address the importance of the leadership aspect of 
turnaround. He observed that the first stage of the typical turnarounds is the management 
change stage, which almost always is required. Mueller and Barker (1997) found that 
frequently there were significant changes in top management teams when firms undertook a 
successful turnaround. Slatter (1984) concurred that change of management was one of the 
ten major generic turnaround strategies used for successful recovery. 
There are four reasons for change in leadership in a potential turnaround situation. 
First, in the light of Argesti and Argesti's (1979) assertion, most failures are due to 
management defects. Heany (1985) also reckoned that management failure is considered the 
major cause of profit trouble; thus the obvious remedy is to fire the general manager. Second, 
the decline in business is likely to reduce management's credibility and that this lack of 
credibility exacerbates the decline (Mintzberg, Raisinghani & Theoret, 1976). New top 
managers, in contrast, often have different backgrounds and experiences from their 
predecessors. They bring new understanding of the firm's environment to bear on the firm's 
problems, enabling productive change to occur (Starbuck, Greve & Hedberg, 1978; Nystrom 
& Starbuck, 1984). 
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Third, removing top managers at a declining firm helps overcome organizational 
inertia (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Schendel et al., 1976; 
Starbuck et al., 1978). Nystrom & Starbuck (1984: 53) reckoned: 
Organizations in serious crises often remove their top managers as a way to 
erase the dominating ideas, to disconfirm past programs, to become receptive 
to new ideas, and to symbolize change. 
New top managers, especially outsiders, can facilitate strategic change because they lack 
personal commitments to previous firm policies and practices (Tushman & Romanelli, 1985). 
Empirical results supported that CEO changes increased the level of strategic change enacted 
by turnaround firms, thus implying CEO changes might also facilitate successful turnaround 
attempts from firm-based decline when the need for strategic change is high (Barker 8c 
Duhaime, 1997). 
Finally, research in the West asserts that increased pressure for the exit of top 
management is caused by the greater involvement of the board of directors (Mintzberg, 
1979). The board's discontent may be most directly expressed by finding a scapegoat for the 
problem (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; O'Neill, 1986)，which is usually directed to the senior 
management headed by the CEO. 
The upper-echelons perspective suggests that actions that led the firm into decline 
were shaped by the policies of the firm's leadership (Brenneman, 1998). Such policies cannot 
be changed easily by those who established them because of their inclination to follow 
through what they have proposed (Starbuck et al., 1978). Thus, taking the firm in new 
directions demands new leadership with a different plan. CEO and executive changes are a 
signal to constituents about firms' commitment to focus on declining performance (Schwartz 
& Menon, 1985). Recently, this aspect of turnaround success has received additional 
empirical support (Barker & Patterson, 1996), though this view is far from universal (Bmton 
et al., 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
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Turnaround Success 
The benchmark against which turnaround success is said to have been achieved is 
important in determining how successful was a given turnaround effort. Some researchers 
have set a relatively lax criterion stating that recovery has been achieved when financial 
measures indicate that the firm has regained its pre-downtum levels of performance (Pearce 
& Robbins, 1993). Others have suggested more stringent criterion such as surpassing the pre-
downtum performance (Bruton & Rubanik, 1997). 
Several well-known turnaround successes undertaken by some of the largest U.S. 
corporations received wide coverage in the press and business publications. These in-depth 
case studies and articles added substance to the large sample empirical studies by-and-large 
conducted by academic researchers, which are not free from criticism (Barker & Duhaime, 
1997). The more widely known cases include Continental Airlines (Bethune & Huler, 1998; 
Brenneman, 1998), IBM (Slater, 1999), Apple Computer (Burrows, 2000), Silicon Graphics 
(Burrows & Reinhardt, 1999)，and Burger King (Ries & Trout, 1993), to name just a few. 
These sources offered “behind the scenes" perspectives of the remarkable comebacks of 
several well-known U.S. firms, often incorporating valuable insights and advice from the top 
management of the firms in distress. 
While these case materials can prove valuable for managers formulating turnaround 
plans, they fail to provide insights on the institutional constraints managers face in East Asia, 
as the majority of these turnarounds took place in the by-and-large homogeneous U.S. 
institutional settings. As noted, there is not much research attempting to investigate the 
unique characteristics of turnaround strategies in the non-U.S. contexts. These studies that 
have considered firm turnaround in a non-Western context are summarized in the following 
section. 
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Turnaround in the Non-U.S. Contexts 
An important strand of literature is starting to link firm strategies to different 
institutional configurations (Child, 2000; Peng, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996). The central 
argument is that unique characteristics of the institutional environment in the non-U. S. 
contexts shape strategies in vastly different ways. The institutional settings of transition 
economies in Eastern Europe and Asia have been documented as distinctive from those in the 
U.S. (Bruton & Rubanik, 1997; Peng & Heath，1996; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
In terms of turnaround efforts, Bruton and Rubanik (1997) used a case study approach 
to examine the turnaround of a high technology firm in Russia, Micron, in the context of an 
economy in transition. They acknowledged that both national culture and firm culture shaped 
turnaround efforts. For instance, the orientation for collective good in Russia put social 
pressures on managers to keep workers because they feel a strong sense of solidarity and 
cohesiveness with their workers, and any dismissed workers face dismal prospects for new 
employment (Bruton & Rubanik, 1997). Therefore, top managers of Micron had a strong 
cultural prejudice against turning the firm around using wide job cuts. In addition, the 
emphasis on status, position and relationships in Russia all played a role in constraining the 
ability to replace top managers (Bruton & Rubanik, 1997). 
Research on turnaround in Thailand and Hong Kong also affirmed the importance of 
institutional context (Bruton et al., 2001). CEOs of troubled firms tended to stonewall --
pretending their firms had no problems until the last moment. They refused to take significant 
steps a Western analyst would think necessary to turn the firm around. In general the board 
would back these CEOs up, and other institutional mechanism failed to enforce action. Only 
the failure to make interest payments lead to significant efforts would turnaround (Bruton et 
al., 2001). Even then it may be tough or impossible to enforce an order to get the firm to 
follow the judgement and install the new top management team (Frank, 2001). 
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The turnaround research outside the U.S. clearly showed that context matters for a 
better understanding of turnaround strategies. As the field of turnaround research matures, 
turnaround research also must transcend the parochial thinking in mainstream organizational 
research (Boyacigiller & Adler, 1991) much the way work in industrial modernization 
(Boisot & Child, 1988; 1996), firm growth (Peng & Heath, 1996), and entrepreneurship 
(Peng, 2000) has accounted for institutions in a non-Western context. A complete theory of 
turnaround has to take the turnaround experience of so many organizations in East Asia into 
consideration (Bruton et al., 2001). The vast difference of social context in East Asia (cf. 
Peng, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996) suggests that in addition to the organizational efficiency 




THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The organizational efficiency perspective and institutional perspective provide an 
overarching framework to explain differences of turnaround actions among North American 
firms and East Asian firms. The President of Honda Motors was once asked to contrast the 
Japanese style of management with the Western one, and he explained that more than ninety-
nine percent of the production activities, the so-called technical core (Scott, 1992), were 
similar, but it is the one percent difference, an institutional layer (Scott, 1992), that made the 
two styles of doing business so distinctive. This proves to be a good starting point for 
contrasting company turnarounds in East Asia and North America. 
Organizing Framework 
It is self-evident that economic efficiency and output are of prime concern for firms in 
distress in both regions. The distinctive East Asian institutional context, however, informs 
that when firms in the two regions undertake the turnaround actions, they tend to focus on 
different aspects. Because of the institutional setting in the West, shareholders of Western 
firms have more power (Allen, 2000; Phan, 2000). Firms therefore are more concerned with 
boosting firm performance to appease shareholders. Their actions are more visible, more 
short-term oriented and tend to provide fast results. Firms in East Asia, however, are 
encouraged to build legitimacy for the top managers and the controlling families with key 
constituencies (Ahlstrom & Bmton, 2001). ^ To one extreme, some researchers found 
evidence of systematic expropriation of the outside shareholders by controlling families at the 
base of extensive corporate pyramids in East Asia through networks of cross-holdings 
5 The extraordinary concentration of family control of firms, even major public ones, is prevalent in East Asian 
(Faccio et al., 2001; Zhuang, 1999). According to a recent study of Faccio and colleagues (2001), eight 
business groups in East Asia control more than one-quarter of the corporations in the nine most advanced East 
Asian economies. 
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(Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001). The resultant actions are less visible, more long-term 
oriented and tend to give results more slowly. Figure 2 presents the overall organizing 
framework of this study. 
Figure 2. An Organizing Framework of Influences on Firm Turnaround 
Institutional perspective 
i i  
Maximizing value for Building legitimacy for 
• Shareholders ^ • TMTs 
Short-term focus \ • Controlling families 
Visible actions ^ ^ • / \ • \ / Long-term focus 
Quick results / / \ V Invisible actions 
_ J West / \ Slow results  
V 
Organizational efficiency perspective 
Efficiency maximization 
Organizational Efficiency Maximization versus Institutionalism 
Organizational efficiency perspective views that the primary objective of 
organizations is to operate at optimal efficiency. In contrast to this perspective, institutional 
theory does not presume that firms' conformance to institutional pressures is a set of 
calculate, conscious actions that aim to improve internal efficiency of the organizations. For 
institutionalists, structures are not functional and rational, they are irrational and of dubious 
effectiveness, being based on narrow conventional ways of thinking, conservative 
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establishment ideas (of the professions, etc.), the desire to attain funding, or outright state 
enforcement (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Institutional theorists hold that there is some rationality and functionality in 
organizational conformation; this avoids confusion, makes them intelligible and legitimate, 
gives them funding and avoids coercive state sanctions. However, this is at best a moderate 
and minimal level of functionality and effectiveness (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This is a 
far cry from the view of structural contingency theorists that organizations adapt their 
structure to attain structures which yield a high level of effectiveness (Donaldson, 1995; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Woodward, 1965). DiMaggio and Powell (1991: 73) make clear 
their basically anti-functionalist stance when they discuss of all three types of isomorphism: 
Each of the institutional isomorphic processes can be expected to proceed in the 
absence of evidence that it increases internal organizational efficiency. To the 
extent that organizational effectiveness is enhanced, the reason is often that 
organizations are rewarded for their similarity to other organizations in their 
fields. This similarity can make it easier for organizations to transact with other 
organizations, to attract career-minded staff, to be acknowledged as legitimate 
and reputable, and to fit into administrative categories that define eligibility for 
public and private grants and contracts. None of this, however, ensures that 
conformist organizations do what they do more efficiently than do their more 
deviant peers. 
Therefore, the benefits flowing from conformity, if any, are not necessarily of the internal 
operational efficiency type (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The context and motives of two 
perspectives are summarized in Table 3. 
In summary, the efficiency perspective assumes that choice of turnaround strategies is 
solely determined by cost-and-benefit calculations. The goal is to maximize efficiency to 
pacify the resentful shareholders, debtors and investors. Institutional forces, on the other hand, 
determine how to achieve organizational efficiency or on what aspects of organizational 
efficiency should be maximized. Legitimacy building emphasizes non-choice behavior of 
organizations in adopting turnaround strategies. The actions are results of conformance to 
collective norms and beliefs. Action takers are characterized by their conventional, 
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conservative way of doing things. The unconscious direction is to build legitimacy for the 
controlling family and key guanxi networks. 
Table 3. A Contrast of Efficiency Maximization and Legitimacy Building Perspectives 
Organizational Efficiency Legitimacy Building 
Perspective Perspective  
Context • Task environment • Institutional environment 
• Active choice behavior • Non-choice behavior 
• Calculate, conscious actions • Conventional, conservative 
actions 
• Functional, rational • Irrational, dubious 
Motives • Maximizing organizational • Maximizing legitimacy of 
internal efficiency controlling family of the firm 
and key guanxi networks 
• Enhancing functionality and • Conforming to collective 
effectiveness of organization norms and beliefs 
• High level of functionality and • Moderate or minimal level of 
effectiveness functionality and effectiveness 
Institutions and Their Impact on Turnaround 
A basic premise of much international management research has been that firms are 
embedded in country-specific institutional arrangements (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; 
Child, 2000). The pervasiveness of country-level effects on organizations is central to the 
field of international management. Scholars have conceptualized and measured country-level 
effects by examining characteristics of national environments that can discriminate between 
countries and can explain the cross-country variance in organizations by focusing on 
identifying fundamental discriminating constructs with the central focus being on culture 
(Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1994). 
An alternative approach to the organizational efficiency draws on institutional theory 
to explain such differences (Kostova, 1997). In general, countries' institutional characteristics 
are a useful basis to examine country-level effects (Child, 2000). It is argued that the 
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institutional characteristics of a country reflect that environment in a relatively encompassing 
way, as they capture various aspects of the national environment including cultural norms, 
social knowledge, rules and regulations, among others (Orm et al., 1997). It is also proposed 
that institutions are issue-specific and therefore institutional characteristics of a country 
should be evaluated with regard to a specific phenomenon rather than in general (Orm, 
Biggart & Hamilton, 1991). Compared to the culture-based approach, this approach should 
provide more precise measures of national environments (Kostova, 1997). 
Institutionalism has roots in both sociology and economics (Scott, 1995a). North 
(1990: 30) argues that "the institutional framework of a society serves as constraints to 
regulate economic activities by providing the rules of the game". An institutional perspective 
traditionally downplays the role of economic maximization in decisions made by individuals, 
professions and organizations and plays up social construction processes (Dunbar & 
Ahlstrom, 1995; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Garud & Rappa, 
1994). DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147) argued, "Structural change in organizations seems 
less driven by competition or by the need for efficiency. Instead...bureaucratization and other 
forms of organizational change occur as the result of processes that make organizations more 
similar without necessarily making them more efficient". The core idea of institutional theory 
is that organizations are shaped by the institutional environment in which they are located, 
rather than by the task environment structured for effective work (Donaldson, 1995). 
Institutional theory argues that the institutional environment is less open to influence by the 
organization and thereby imposes difficult-to-resist conformity pressures on the organizations 
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Thus, individuals and organizations often adapt to the 
surrounding institutional system, sometimes subconsciously (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
1991). 
Institutionalized rules and practices create a context that shapes and reaffirms the 
cognition and behavior of managers and the actions they choose to pursue and employ. 
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Managers operating within institutional boundaries, particularly in a strong institutional 
environment (Scott, 1992), find themselves subject to social meanings that encourages them 
to conform to a series of recognized and established beliefs about what actions can be 
undertaken. They select certain actions not simply because they are the most efficient or the 
best to the organization, but because conformance confers legitimacy (Ahlstrom, 1996; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995a). Institutional forces include socio-political aspects 
and cognitive elements that can influence firms and individuals. Organizations and 
individuals are granted legitimacy by utilizing correct structures and procedures, not for the 
quantity or efficiency of their output (Suchman, 1995; Scott, 1992). In DiMaggio and 
Powell's (1983: 153) words, “It is important to note that each of the institutional isomorphic 
processes can be expected to proceed in the absence of evidence that they increase 
organizational internal efficiency". This perspective suggests that patterns in turnaround can 
vary across different institutional environments. The notion of financial interests alone is too 
simplistic of an explanation to the turnaround actions taken in East Asia. Though firms in 
distress ~ in the East and the West alike ~ strive to rehabilitate and to achieve profitability at 
the retrenchment and recovery stage, East Asian firms took avenues that stray from the 
Western prescription due to complications arising from defending the legitimacy of the 
controlling shareholder/family in managing the firm. Therefore, the paths to financial 
recovery the East Asian managers took may neither be the most efficient nor the most 
appropriate ones in the eyes of shareholders and investors. 
The Western turnaround model is developed within a very distinct institutional 
framework, characterized by a relatively free market economy with less normative and 
cognitive constraints that confronted in Chinese communities in which firms can adopt 
certain measures to turn their firms around. One distinguishing characteristic is that most East 
Asia economies have a deeply entrenched concentrated ownership structure, characterized by 
significant family control and interlocking shareholdings among the affiliated firms and 
28 
banks (Allen, 2000; Zhuang, 1999). The weak regulatory system and poor corporate 
governance complicate the problem. The resulting tension created by the institutional 
environment suggests major differences in how turnaround is undertaken in East Asia (cf. 
Peng, 2000; Peng & Heath, 1996). 
Institutional framework is made up of both formal and informal constraints (North, 
1990) around individual and organizational behavior. Formal constraints include "political 
(judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts，，’ (Peng & Heath, 1996: 499) and informal 
constraints, on the other hand, include “codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and convention, 
which are embedded in the culture and ideology" (Peng & Heath, 1996: 500). In situations 
where formal constraints fail, informal constraints will come into play (North, 1990; Scott, 
1995a; Peng & Heath, 1996). Institutions include a wide variety of different unconscious 
ways. There is some disagreement about which institutional elements impact organizations, 
in what way, and how to organize those various items (Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). However, 
among two of the leading theorists much commonality can be found on these items. Scott 
(1995a) presented the relevant institutional forces under the terms of regulatory, normative 
and cognitive. His definitions of theses forces are analogous to DiMaggio's and Powell's 
(1983) institutional forces termed as coercive, normative and mimetic. This thesis follows 
Busenitz, Gomez and Spencer (2000), Kostova (1997), and Scott (1995a) in viewing the 
regulatory, cognitive, and normative dimensions as conceptually related yet empirically 
distinct. 
Regulatory Environment 
Institutional research rooted in economics recognizes the regulative aspects of 
institutions (North, 1986, 1990). Regulatory processes involve the setting of rules and their 
enforcement. Sanctions, laws and political power thus serve to regulate individual and 
organizational action (Scott, 1995a). As Scott (1995a) observes, these processes can work 
through formal or informal methods. More specifically, how organizations came into 
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existence and how they operate are strongly influenced by the institutional framework (North, 
1990; Scott, 1995a). Financial and commercial rules in East Asia are generally less developed 
than that in the West and often not strictly enforced (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). This has 
strong bearing on corporate governance and disclosure and thus managers' responses to firm 
decline. Due to the wide geographic dispersion of East Asian population, however, these 
regulatory institutions are of less concern than normative and cognitive environment in 
decline situations since firms face such different rules in different countries. 
Normative Environment 
Selznick (1949) discussed the normative aspect of institutions in the original 
formulations of institutional theory. Since then, March (1981) and Scott (1995a) have 
continued to stress the normative nature of institutions and conceptualized it as what is 
expected of individuals. The normative aspect of institutions provides conscious choices 
concerning individual roles and is more concerned with common understandings about what 
is proper in a certain situation (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1995a). Thus, normative 
institutions are treated as purposely constructed and include authority systems and roles that 
occur in response to what is consciously perceived as necessary and proper (Scott, 1995a). 
For example, prior research has found regulatory professional associations among 
accountants (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998) and the medical professionals (Freidson, 1988; Starr, 
1982) have created such institutions in the West. In East Asia, the normative aspect of 
concentrated ownership structure and legitimate rule of families in corporations are 
institutions that shape turnaround activities. 
Cognitive Environment 
Unlike regulatory structures which are negotiated arrangements and relatively rational 
solutions to exchange problems that change readily (North, 1990), cognitive components of 
institutions are quite resilient (Scott, 1995a). They are often socially constructed over time 
(Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and come to "perceived as objective and external to the actors: 
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not as man-made but a natural and factual order" (Scott, 1995b: xvii). Cognitive structures 
can constrain actors by schema, frames and scripts, often without their conscious knowledge 
(Scott, 1995b). Culture is the principle means by which cognitive institutions are transmitted. 
The role of culture in shaping organizational behavior has similarly recognized in 
other disciplines. For example, recent work in anthropology has discussed culture in terms of 
socially established structures of meaning (Geertz, 1973) that control people's worldviews 
and what action is possible, and what is unlikely to be considered (Scott, 1995b). This 
includes informal constrains embodied in traditions, taken-for-granted rules and conventions, 
preconscious widely accepted customs (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Thus, there is cross-
disciplinary support for the importance of culture of East Asian groups in shaping 
organization actions and turnaround activities. 
Regulatory institutions are not yet of prime importance in East Asia (Backman, 1999; 
Peng, 2000; Young, Ahlstrom, Bruton & Chan, 2001; Young & Chan, 2001). This is 
especially true in Hong Kong and Singapore where the regulatory environment resembles that 
of the U.S., though it has been accused of weaker legal protection for minority shareholders. 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Faccio et al.，2001; Young & Chan, 2001; Zhuang, 
1999). The result is that when examining a widespread ethnic group across different 
industries and countries, it is primarily the normative- and cognitive-based institutions that 
are transmitted through a strong culture and shape organizational action regarding 
turnaround. The analysis of firm turnaround should take into account the nature of the extant 
institutions that can impact the firm's actions. Established characteristics of Chinese culture 
such as guanxi (Luo, 2000)，connectiveness among business people (Tsang & Walls, 1998), 
family ownership of firms (Allen, 2000; Ang et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2001; Young & 
Chan, 2001; Zhuang, 1999) and the role of strong owner/managers who run public firms in a 
manner similar to family businesses in the West (Backman, 1999) can impact a turnaround 
effort. 
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Institutional Environment in East Asia and the West 
The section contrasts the institutional environment in East Asia and the West. The 
predominant role the Overseas Chinese play in many of East Asia economies is first 
discussed. Then the discussion is framed into three subsections: (1) the regulatory 
environment that enforces written rules to regulate commercial activities, (2) the normative 
environment that is shaped by professional standards and commercial conventions, and (3) 
the cognitive environment that provides unwritten rules that constraint business transactions. 
In each subsection, the institutions in the West are briefly reviewed, then the institutional 
environment in East Asia is contrasted to the Western model and aspects that have significant 
bearings on business activities are highlighted. 
Overseas Chinese as the Powerhouse of East Asian Economies 
The diaspora of some 55 million Overseas Chinese (Kraar, 1994; Seagrave, 1995) is a 
powerhouse in many of the East Asia economies, without which today's prosperity in the 
region would be difficult to attain. Its members dominate trade and investment in every East 
Asian country except Korea and Japan. Asia, along with North America and Western Europe, 
represent the three distinct regions that have emerged as the leading centers of the global 
economy (Ohmae, 1995). The ethnic-Chinese communities in East Asia wield an economic 
clout disproportionate to their numbers^ (Vatikiotis, 1998; Yeung, 1999). This is obvious not 
only in countries where the majority of the population is Chinese such as Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, but also valid in the less visible Chinese communities like Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. The Chinese businesses ~ many of which are located outside the 
6 In Singapore, ethnic Chinese make up 77% of population, and control 81% of listed firms by market 
capitalization. In Malaysia, ethnic Chinese make up 29% of population, but control 69% of share capital by 
market capitalization. In Thailand, ethnic Chinese make up an estimated 10% of population, but control 81% 
of listed firms by market capitalization. In Indonesia, ethnic Chinese make up 3.5% of population, but control 
73% of listed firms by market capitalization. In Philippines, ethnic Chinese make up 2% of population, but 
control 50%-60% of share capital by market capitalization. Source: Overseas Chinese Business Networks in 
Asia by the East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia. 
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People's Republic of China itself ~ as a group make up the world's fourth economic power 
(Kao, 1993; Weidenbaum & Hughes, 1996). The Overseas Chinese possess the biggest 
reservoir of capital in the region ~ conservatively estimated to control some $2 trillion in 
liquid assets (Kraar, 1994) and the private wealth of East Asia's 10 million ethnic Chinese 
was estimated to exceed $0.2 trillion (Kao, 1993). If these enterprising souls lived in one 
country, its gross national product would tally at least $500 billion ~ larger than the $410 
billion GDP of Mainland China (Kraar, 1994). Overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Taiwan predominate and eclipse Japan as the primary source of capital and foreign 
investment for the region with the world's fastest-growing economy (Kao, 1993; Kraar, 
1994)7 Many of the firms fit in the old Asian conglomerate model in which relationships and 
legitimacy matter more than efficiency and transparency (Rohwer, 2000). 
Institutional theory proves to be a useful lens through which to examine why the 
turnaround actions are different in East Asia. Each of these forces and the institutions within 
them can play a role in how firms in East Asia effect a turnaround. 
Regulatory Environment ~ Written Rules 
Due to the feudalistic nature of transactions in East Asia, the rule of law is weaker, 
disclosure requirements are lower, minority shareholders have little or no say in firm actions 
throughout East Asia (Allen, 2000; Boisot & Child, 1996; Young et al., 2001). The 
characteristics and behaviors of Chinese family businesses in East Asia are fairly consistent 
across the region (Weidenbaum, 1996). ^ The regulatory systems in Hong Kong and 
Singapore are considered among the best in Asia, albeit, they are not without beamish. 
7 The foreign reserves held in the hands of Overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan was $211.9 
billions while the Japanese had $106.4; similarly, foreign direct investment in Asia by Overseas Chinese in 
these three countries was $26.0 billions while that in Japan was $3.7 billions in 1993 (Kraar, 1994). 
There are differences among countries in East Asia. Singapore in particular has more stringent rule of law and 
enforcement, while Indonesia is the worst in this regard (Phan, 1998). 
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Insolvency laws 
Many of the East Asian countries have a legal insolvency regime and significant parts 
of each regime have been based upon models in advanced countries for historical reasons. 
For example, the corporate liquidation laws of Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore have 
been modeled on English law, while the Indonesian bankruptcy law has developed from 
Dutch law, and the Philippines insolvency law regime has elements of American influence. 
(Asian Development Bank, 1999; Zhuang, 1999). A recent Asian Development Bank (1999) 
study on insolvency law reforms in nine developing member countries concludes that there 
was very little recourse to formal insolvency procedures in the countries under study. Zhuang 
(1999: 9) attributes this to the aversion to formal insolvency procedures, "partly due to slow, 
inexpensive, expensive, unpredictable, and unreliable judicial processes, and partly due to 
cultural norms in dispute resolution". 
Regulations of financial markets 
Capital markets are not well developed in most East Asian countries. The banking 
sector plays a dominant role in corporate financing; the role of equity and bond markets is 
relatively insignificant. Compared to industrialized economies, stock markets in many East 
Asian countries are typically characterized by “low liquidity, thin trading, large volatility, 
extensive speculation, weak regulatory frameworks, poor transparency, inadequate 
disclosure, and undeveloped market infrastmcture"(Zhuang, 1999: 4). The net result is the 
overwhelming influence of controlling families over company policies. 
Corporate governance 
In the U.S. there is a very open market-based system, so there is a natural tendency 
for more information and more disclosure. The SEC regulations are the toughest in the world 
on insider trading, on regulations on quarterly reporting, regulations on independent 
directorship, on related party transactions. NASDAQ is the most developed exchange in the 
world, in terms of protecting minority investors' interest, to ensure that management is 
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accountable for what they do (Washington Times, 2000). Corporate governance mechanisms 
are stronger in North America where large-scale institutional investors and shareholder 
activists are playing a pivotal role in monitoring company activities and disciplining 
managers (Zhuang, 1999). Pension fund, mutual funds, and insurance companies are hiring 
professionally trained personnel on behalf of dispersed shareholders to monitor the 
companies they invested in. Because of their relatively large holdings in individual 
companies, they exercise external discipline on the companies. To maintain the support of 
important external constituents, senior managers of the failing firms are bounded to succumb 
to them. For instance, in the U.S., the California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS) ($68 billion in assets), and the New York City comptroller's office ($38 billion 
pension fund) has pressed target organizations to initiate board changes in response to poor 
organizational performance (Allen, 2000; Fromson, 1990; Salwen & Lublin, 1992). In the 
U.K., it is estimated that the members of the National Association of Pension Funds ($650 
billion in assets) and the Association of British Insurers together own as much as 40% of 
U.K. listed equities (managing funds worth $1600 billions). That gives them a strong 
influence in companies in which they invest (Webb-site.com, 2001a). 
Corporate governance mechanisms are generally weaker in East Asia than in the West 
(Young et al., 2001). The enforcement of minority shareholder and creditor rights is 
undermined by a weak judicial system (Zhuang, 1999). The legal and regulatory framework 
in many East Asian countries still permits companies to have dubious governance practice. 
This is even true in relatively well-developed markets such as Hong Kong and Singapore, 
whose corporate regulations are already ahead of most jurisdictions in East Asia and are 
moving toward the international standards. However limited in scope, Hong Kong and 
Singapore have small codes of best practice. (Allen, 2000; Phan, 2000). In response to the 
Asian economic crisis, governments in the region have been making strong efforts to clean up 
their financial and regulatory regimes - insider laws become stricter, contract laws tighter, 
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competition policies more rigorous and capital markets more efficient {The Economist, 2000). 
Singapore government is among the most aggressive in promoting corporate governance 
reforms, moving toward the international standards along the Western lines (Allen, 2000), 
and Hong Kong is expected to follow suit. Hong Kong is considering raising the minimum 
float, although this is unlikely to lead to radical changes (Allen, 2000). The Malaysian 
government is also painstakingly improving corporate governance system. All listed firms 
now have to disclose their quarterly results, complete with balance sheets and profit-and-loss 
statements — something neither Singapore nor Hong Kong requires as yet. This rule makes 
listed companies more transparent and allows investors to make informed decisions 
(Jayasankaran, 2000). 
Minority shareholder and creditor rights 
Studies emerging since the Asian economic crisis suggest that corporate governance 
systems in most East Asian countries resemble the relationship-based model (Zhuang, 1999), 
which makes people ask why they need transparency. In Hong Kong and Singapore, although 
the governance structure is putatively based on the formal, more mechanical Anglo-Saxon 
model, they depart from this model in their actual function (Young et al., 2001). Outside 
shareholders and creditors play a weak role in monitoring and disciplining companies and 
managers, leaving insiders with excessive power to pursue their own interests at the expense 
of outsiders (Faccio et al., 2001; Zhuang, 1999). A stark example is that even though the 
Listing Rules in Hong Kong require the board to have at least two independent non-executive 
directors, they do not prohibit the controlling shareholders from appointing independent 
directors. The so-called independent directors are in fact interdependent directors (Boeker, 
1989; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson, 1998) that are little more 
than rubber stamps (Weidenbaum, 1996; Young et al., 2001). One well-known Hong Kong-
based analyst commented that "[it] is a clear absurdity that the controlling shareholders 
effectively appoint the people who are supposed to prevent them from abusing the company" 
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(Webb-site.com, 1999). The characteristics of the governance system in East Asia is the 
emphasis of form over substance ~ the independent director role is largely ceremonial in 
nature with regard to the control function (cf. Young et al., 2001). 
In East Asia legal protection for outsider shareholders and creditors tends to be weak 
due to poor legal enforcement and disclosure (Khanna & Palepu, 1999; Zhuang, 1999). The 
laws and regulations are in place, but they are not well enforced. David Webb, an 
independent financial commentator and author of a well-known Hong Kong corporate 
governance website commented “[g]ood laws and regulations worth nothing if they are not 
enforced. Many of the existing and promised rights of shareholders are practically 
unenforceable on the grounds of legal costs". He explained: 
In the U.S. shareholders can instruct lawyers on a contingent fee basis (no win, 
no fee), which lowers the barriers to pursuing legal action, and claims can also 
reach class action status, representing a much larger group of shareholders 
affected by the matter under claim. From a practical point of view, individual 
Hong Kong shareholders normally cannot afford to go to court to enforce their 
rights. Even the first round of a claim may cost more than their investment 
(Webb-site.com, 2001b). 
Besides, the litigation can take years. As an example, TPFs founder and chairman, 
Mr. Prachai, used Thailand's tangled legal system to fend off his creditors (see Frank, 2001). 
The court battles have taken years. The high transaction cost involved in enforcing contracts 
through the time consuming and reliable judicial processes turn companies away and instead 
they rely on relationship-based approach, conforming to institutional pressures. 
To conclude, the formal constraints such as legal framework, political stability, 
governance structure, etc. in Hong Kong and Singapore, though still have their limitations, 
are relatively more congruent with that in the West compared with other jurisdictions in the 
East Asia. 
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Normative Environment ~ Professional Standards and Commercial Conventions 
Disclosure 
In terms of professional standards and conventions, disclosure standards are less 
stringent in East Asia (Khanna & Palepu，1999). Even where Anglo-American principles are 
firmly entrenched in the governance system, it is apparent that many companies follow more 
the form rather than substance (Allen, 2000; Young et al., 2001). Allen (2000) elucidates the 
phenomenon: 
Although the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong seeks to "apply the spirit of the 
rules, rather than mechanistically following their letter”，the average Hong 
Kong company follows more the letter than the spirit. For example, most 
annual reports say the legal minimum, but not a lot more, about accounting 
policies, connected transactions, director's stock interests, substantial 
shareholders, and other corporate governance measures. The listing rules do 
not require any evaluation of board performance, director attendance, or even 
details on director remuneration. While companies must include a statement 
on their compliance with the Hong Kong code of best practice and its new 
1999 clause on audit committees, the typical annual report carries a 
perfunctory statement to the effect that the company compiled throughout the 
year with these guidelines (Allen, 2000: 26-27). 
These corporate insiders, mainly families and family groups, have little tradition and little 
appreciation of disclosure and sharing corporate control (Allen, 2000; Weidenbaum, 1996; 
Young et al., 2001; Zhuang, 1999). The wealthiest tycoon in East Asia, Li Ka-shing, whose 
opacity is made public, is a stark illustration of the general disinclination to disclosing 
information to minority shareholders that pervade the markets in East Asia. 
For a long time, Li Ka-shing，s bi-annual analyst briefings were the butt of 
investors' jokes, because he would lump together both his enormous holding 
groups, Cheung Kong and Hutchison Whampoa, which together own scores of 
unrelated businesses, into one short presentation {The Economist, 2000: 67). 
Market for Corporate Control 
The well-accepted notion of the market for corporate control ~ an external 
governance mechanism in disciplining managers that becomes active when a firm's internal 
controls fail -- works less effectively in East Asian than in North America (Walsh & Kosnik, 
1993; Zhuang, 1999). Well-governed institutional investors are still very few. Large publicly 
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controlled funds and investment banks have been mostly passive players in corporate matters. 
Takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, are also rare in East Asia (Khanna & Palepu, 1999; 
Zhuang, 1999). 
Cognitive Environment -- Unwritten Rules 
Informal constraints ~ entrenched business and social norms -- play a larger role in 
regulating economic exchanges (North, 1990) and explaining the variance of economic 
activities/exchanges with regard to turnaround in these East Asian countries. Overseas 
Chinese firms rely more on networking and personal trust because they offer some 
consistency and predictability despite the change of formal institutional frameworks 
(Luthans, Stajkovic & Ibrayeva, 2000). 
Family ownership and CEO duality 
Whereas most North American firms are widely held, the ownership form that 
dominates the scene in East Asia is a controlling family (Allen, 2000; Zhuang, 1999), which 
often supplies a top manager (Faccio et al., 2001; Zhuang) that dominate the board and the 
top management team, and with little incentive to protect minority shareholders. In Hong 
Kong, for instance, there are very few companies that do not have a controlling shareholder ~ 
the only sizeable exception is HSBC Holdings pic, which is a UK-domiciled company, whose 
ownership is wide-spread (Webb-site.com, 1999). The role of a strong owner/manager who 
runs a public firm in a manner similar to family businesses in the West (Backman, 1995) is 
one of the established characteristics that have strong implications on turnaround efforts in 
East Asia. The emphasis on family business is deeply ingrained in the Confucian-based 
Chinese culture and value system ~ one that considers family more important than the state 
and patriarchal authority informs the values of the typical Chinese entrepreneur who seeks to 
control his own small dynasty (Kao, 1993). Past research has found that the Confucian 
tradition is remarkably persistent (Kao, 1993). A vivid metaphor is the Chinese entrepreneurs 
manage traditional enterprises much as a Chinese emperor would his empire and the assets of 
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the firm usually are passed on only to family members (Kao, 1993). East Asian corporations 
are more likely to be family owned and controlled (Carney, 1998; Kao, 1993; Young et al., 
2001; Zhuang, 1999), thus there is less of an understanding of the concept of separation of the 
organization from the owners (Ang et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2000).^ Most commonly, a 
patriarchal founder runs a corporate empire with unquestioned authority, and installs family 
members to manage the outposts of his group (Ang et al., 2000; Kao, 1993; Weidenbaum, 
1996) since Asian management practices are somewhat less trusting of outsiders (Ang et al., 
2000; Weidenbaum, 1996), though exceptions do exist.川 
The monitoring, service and control role of board of directors are much weaker in 
East Asia (Young et al., 2001). The boards of directors are re-appointed year after year 
simply because they are willing to “rubber-stamp” the CEO's decisions (Phan, 1998: 51). 
Boards have been accused of pandering to the interests of management, a situation 
exacerbated by the dominance of executive board members (Allen, 2000; Phan, 1998). Even 
the public companies they run are merely parts of family-controlled conglomerates that rarely 
reveal the full details of their finances or ownership structure. 
The businesses the Overseas Chinese dominate, fields like trading, real estate, 
finance, and a number of commodities and unbranded products, tends to keep them out of the 
public's eyes. This can be traced back to their history as a minority group of emigrants, long 
suffering from racial persecution and discrimination (Kao, 1993). Thus, most Overseas 
Chinese of the Pacific Basin therefore maintain their low profile (Weidenbaum, 1996). 
Western countries also experienced a "family business period" and evolved at various 
intervals to form the more common corporate forms seen today (Chandler, 1990). The 
corporate wealth in East Asia is highly concentrated among a few families (Claessens et al., 
9 This separation of ownership and control is the centerpiece of agency theory and the theory of the firm as this 
separation is critical to the efficient functioning of a corporate governance system because it led to 
specialization of risk bearing and managerial expertise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Phan, 2000). 
10 Vtech takes pain to point out that they are not a family company (see Exhibit 1 in Young et al., 2001). 
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2000; Faccio et al., 2001; Zhuang, 1999). Many of the listing companies nowadays were 
evolved from small, centralized firms dominated by an owner-manager in the past. When 
these firms go public, these controlling owners often maneuvered to hold the positions of 
Founding (or Executive Chairperson) Chairperson and Managing Director. The patriarch 
owner is the central strategic figure of the firm who is rallied by his family members, cronies 
and trusted associates holding key positions in the firm (Ang et al., 2000). Claessens and 
colleagues (2000) found that managers of closely held firms tend to be relatives of the 
controlling shareholder's family” The legitimacy of their authority is well received without 
being questioned. This situation is exacerbated by the tendency of corporations to have 
interlocking directorates and management boards in East Asia, whereby members of one 
family would serve on the board of directors or management board of companies controlled 
by other influential families (Claessens et al., 2000; Zhuang, 1999). Many of these publicly 
traded firms are pseudo-public companies or family business in disguise. The family control 
of firms in East Asia has strong implications for turnaround actions regarding change of firm 
principals and asset retrenchment (Young & Chan, 2001). 
Guanxi networks 
Another characteristic of Chinese communities ~ the dominance of guanxi network in 
commercial activities -- is well documented. Kao (1993) and Xin and Pearce (1996) proposed 
that one reason executives seek out connections and cultivate close personal relationships is 
to obtain resources or protection not otherwise available. Redding (1990) and Zucker (1986) 
added that personal connections seem particularly important to executives in countries 
without a stable legal and regulatory environment that allows for impersonal business 
dealings. In Chinese communities, interpersonal connections are called guanxi (Xin & 
Pearce, 1996). In her comprehensive study, Yang (1994: 1-2) stated that guanxi literally 
11 Claessens and colleagues (2000) in a recent study found that in East Asian countries, the top management of 
about 60% of firms that are not widely held is related to the family of the controlling shareholder. 
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means "a relationship" between objects, forces, or persons. When it is used to refer to 
relationships between people, not only can it be applied to husband-wife, kinship and 
friendship relations, it can also have the sense of “social connections," dyadic relationships 
that are based implicitly (rather than explicitly) on mutual interest and benefit. Once guanxi is 
established between two people, each can ask a favor of the other with the expectation that 
the debt incurred will be repaid sometime in the future. Davies, Leung, Luk and Wong's 
(1995) survey of Hong Kong Chinese executives regarding the importance of guanxi 
relationships addresses the role of guanxi in reducing transaction costs associated with 
environmental uncertainties. They found that the executives believed that once good guanxi 
was established, a number of benefits, such as smooth running of routine business operations, 
greater access to information about government policies, and quicker receipt of 
administrative approvals, would follow. Gwa^xz-based exchange offers the advantage of 
reduced opportunistic behavior (Standifird & Marshall, 2000) since gwawxz-based exchange 
does not require extensive documentation or litigation and the primary transaction cost 
associated is only the cultivation of personal relations. In communities where contract law is 
costly to enforce, the gwawxz-based exchange is more prevalent. 
The Chinese commonwealth has an "open architecture", the network has permeable 
borders where connections can be established or discontinued (Kao, 1993). Guanxi is 
embedded in dyadic relationships between two people, not organizational entities. Hence, 
guanxi is a personal asset that cannot be transferred. Consequently, when a person with the 
right and strong guanxi leaves an organization, the latter loses the guanxi or goodwill (Yeung 
& Tung, 1996: 61). A cursory review of the situations in other economically advanced or 
more developed Confucian societies such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan will show 
that "the establishment of institutional law will not displace the reliance on connections" 
(Yeung & Tung, 1996: 64). The emphasis of guanxi in East Asia has strong bearing on East 
Asian firms' credit granting practices in commercial activities. 
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This all suggests that East Asian firms tend to place greater emphasis on maintaining 
legitimacy of family members and legitimacy in their guanxi, whereas U.S. managers tend to 
maximize organizational efficiency in order to satisfy shareholders. In East Asia, large family 
shareholders are encouraged by the institutions to maximize the returns on their family 
holdings, if need be, at the expense of outsider investors. In many countries, for instance, 
there have been cases where a family group sold at below market prices the products or 
services of a listed company in which it was a controlling shareholder, to a connected 
company that the family group wholly owned. Or alternatively, the listed company purchased 
products, services, or assets of the sister company at above market prices (Faccio et al., 2001; 
Frank, 2001; Zhuang, 1999). A stark illustration was Charoen Pokphand Group, the largest 
ethnic Chinese business group in Thailand, of which its founders injected privately held 
assets into public companies in a way that maximized his family's returns (see Balfour, 
2001). This internal transfer of wealth of the listed company to the privately held holding 
company put the wealth of the minority shareholders and outsider investors at jeopardy. 
Another drawback of attaching great importance to maintaining guanxi is missed 
opportunities to source low-cost suppliers to achieve greater economy or efficiency 
(Weidenbaum, 1996). Table 4 highlights the differences of the regulatory, normative and 
cognitive environment between the U.S., and East Asia that have bearings on turnaround 
actions. 
In summary, the dominance of Overseas Chinese firms in the Asia and the challenges 
of effecting turnarounds in East Asia under the unique institutional contexts, especially after 
the financial turmoil, have called upon a new line of inquiries. The U.S. context depends 
more on written rules and well-accepted norms and standards, whereas the East Asian 
environment depends on the legitimacy building based on unwritten cultural values and 
commercial conventions. The questions pertaining to researchers, managers and workout 
specialists are how the unique institutional environment in East Asia, as a whole, shape 
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turnaround actions; particularly what are the differences between the turnaround actions in 
East Asia and the West. 
Table 4. The Magnitude of Three Institutional Forces in the U.S. and East Asia 
Strong Weak  
Regulatory U.S. Hong Kong and Singapore 
Strong legal framework, transparent Legal system and corporate 
and well-regulated financial markets governance mechanism are relatively 
and effective corporate governance weak, but are moving to subscribe to 
system, with strong protection for Western standards. Reporting 
institutional investors and minority standards are more lax, cross 
shareholders. holdings present, more insider 
control of information and flexibility 
of insider action based on financials. 
Normative U.S. Hong Kong and Singapore 
Professional standards play an Professional norms not as accepted, 
important role in confining business Disclosure and market for corporate 
activities. control are insignificant in confining 
manager's behaviors. 
Cognitive Hong Kong and Singapore U.S. 
Conformity to Overseas Chinese Cultural values and norms vary in 
business practices as a result of different parts of the U.S. Unwritten 
family ownership, CEO duality and rules are less important than codified 
importance of guanxi networks. laws and regulations. 
Hypotheses 
Change in Leadership 
Past research in the West showed that turnaround efforts were usually preceded by a 
change in top management (O'Neill, 1986). "In the Western model of corporate governance, 
sovereignty rests with shareholders, and there one of the boards of directors' major 
responsibilities is to replace the chairman or CEO of a firm if all else fails" (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). Whereas in the West, top managers can be held personally liable for the poor 
firm performance, such governance system has yet to exist in East Asia (Byrne, 1995). The 
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powerful shareholders in North American firms can request the replacement of the CEOs if 
they are unsatisfied with firms' performance, or they can even sue them for breach of duty if 
the CEOs are prove to have misconducts in managing the firms. "Strategic reorientations are 
rooted in cognitive shifts, and turnarounds almost always involve both significant changes in 
top management and changes in overall strategies (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).” 
Unlike the firms in North America where the CEO is the central strategic figure and is 
blamed for firm decline, in East Asia the owner typically holds the position of Board Chair 
and has complete control over the firms' decisions. Often they are both the Founding 
Chairman and the Managing Director. Thus, the analysis of leadership and daily control of 
the firms in Asia should focus on the Board of Directors but not the CEO, which is normally 
the focus in the West. The Chairman is the central strategic figure in the firms in East Asia, 
which is confirmed by qualitative interviews (Bmton et al., 2001). In fact, the data collection 
in this study shows many listed firms in Hong Kong and Singapore do not even have a CEO 
position; the Chair fills the role of directing strategy while overseeing operations. ^ ^ 
Among East Asian firms, the chairman is controlling the strategic direction of the firm 
and the board, check-and-balance is not as strong as that among North American firms. It is 
less likely for the board or the top management of the firm, many of whom often are family 
members and relatives, close business associates and cronies installed by the Chairperson in 
the firm, to force the Chairperson to resign when compared to that in the West. Typically, a 
patriarch runs a corporate empire with unquestioned authority, and installs sons, nephews and 
in-laws to manage the strategic positions of his group {The Economist, 2000; Weidenbaum, 
1996). East Asian boards of directors are likely to be more beholden to the Chairperson/CEO 
than are the Western boards (Young & Chan, 2001). They are less likely to have independent 
outside directors (Backman, 1999). Directors of East Asian firms are more likely to show 
12 In the sample of this study, the proportion of firms that have the CEO position in Hong Kong is about 10%, 
while that for Singapore is about 15%. Many firms that do not have the position of CEO have the title 
Managing Director instead. 
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deference to the CEO as a result of the Confucian culture. They are less likely to openly 
confront the Chairman as this would cause him to lose ‘face’ (Young et al., 2001). The 
shareholders are less powerful when compared to their western counterparts. The 
owner/manager often control the board and subdue minority shareholders' voice. It is 
uncommon if ever the firm principals will be forced by the minority shareholders to step 
down. The Chairman maneuvers to remain in his office unless he is forced by his principal 
creditors to step down, as shown in the TPI case. 
Hypothesis la. The change of CEO in North American firms occurs more 
often than change of Chairperson in East Asian firms in a turnaround situation. 
In the West, in order to change the strategic direction of the firms, it is usually 
desirable to have a new CEO to head the management under a turnaround situation and such 
a change in leadership will lead to improvement in firm performance. But in East Asia, the 
difficulties involved in forcing the Chairman/CEO to resign will lead to a lesser degree of 
performance improvement. Among East Asian firms, the chairman may have a number of 
connections that are valuable. The guanxi of a strategic figure can assist with sales contracts 
and distribution access (see Shaw & Meier, 1994). In credit granting, guanxi relationships of 
the chairman provide important sources of commercial security and financing sources (cf. 
Chen, 1999). In time of financial difficulties, the chairman acquiring the credit to rescue the 
firm has staked his or her personal reputation with the company in question. The better 
developed the guanxi network, the greater chance the firm is able to secure credit that is 
badly in need (cf. Chen, 1999). Guanxi with key people can also keep informed of changes in 
relevant policy, gamer the necessary licenses, permits, and approvals, and gain access to 
government procurement contract offerings (Standifird & Marshall, 2000). ^ ^ It should be 
noted that guanxi relates to personal, not corporate, relations (Davies et al., 1995) and such 
13 Though these kind of gwaracz-based benefits are less pronounced in Hong Kong and Singapore than in 
Mainland China, they still have some relevance. 
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guanxi capital will be forfeited if the chairman is replaced, and this may be an action that 
does not facilitate turnaround for Asian firms. 
Hypothesis lb. The change of CEO results in greater performance improvement 
among North American firms than that of the change of Chairperson among East 
Asian firms. 
Net Fixed Asset Reduction 
Selling off non-core assets have been promoted in the West as the quick solution for 
restructuring, especially for diversified conglomerates as it could quickly reduce the huge 
debt the companies have built up, and more fundamentally, reduce inefficiencies (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1999: 126). In the West, the predominant form of ownership of large firms is widely 
held public companies (Faccio et al., 2001). As a result of the separation of management from 
ownership, managers are the stewards/agents of the shareholders of the firm while the 
influence of owners is diffused because of multiple shareholders. The shareholders value the 
firm in term of market value of its stock price rather than asset value. In times of financial 
difficulties, managers are more likely to sell off fixed assets for cash, by restructuring the 
firm's asset in a proper way in order to support the stock price of the firm. Even in the case of 
family ownership, stronger institutional framework in the West (for example, corporate 
dividend and debt policies) restrains the controlling family and thus fewer opportunities to 
expropriate" (Faccio et al., 2001). 
The dual leadership structure (CEOs or Managing Directors, who are often the 
controlling shareholder of the firm, concurrently holding the position of board chairperson) is 
so common in the Chinese firms that these firms are managed like family businesses in the 
14 Contrary to popular belief, family ownership is even more widespread in Europe than in Asia (Faccio et al., 
2001). Faccio and colleagues (2001) in a study which traced the ultimate owners of all listed corporations in 
five West European economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Britain) and compared them to the nine 
East Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand) of the World Bank study. The results show that families and business groups play just 
as important a role in Europe as in Asia. For example, 43% of European corporations are controlled by 
families, compared with 38% in Asia; 68% of European corporations have top managers from the controlling 
family, compared with 57% in Asia. This tendency is not so much a resultant of "Asian values" as of a 
certain stage of capitalist development {The Economist, 2000) and institutional structure (Boisot & Child, 
1996). 
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West even though technically they are listed companies ~ violating the accountability 
principle (Phan, 1998). The controlling families of these de facto private firms perceived 
firms' assets as their family property, passed on only to the heirs from one generation to 
another (Kao, 1993; also see Balfour, 2001). They are keen on keeping control of corporate 
resources, thus are reluctant to sell off them despite the fact that they are in financial 
difficulties. A cornerstone of the Chinese business system is that Chinese entrepreneurs have 
an invariable practice of grooming their children, mainly sons, as dynastic successors in order 
that control over the business can be maintained within the family (Kao, 1993; Redding, 
1990; Tsang, 1996)15. Under the cultural influences, the action of selling off assets is 
interpreted as shameful, if not morally retarded/censored action, not only to the individual 
who performed the action but also to the whole family clan or extended family that controlled 
the assets. Not only the founding members themselves, but also their descendents are 
reluctant to sell assets, given there are viable alternatives. The Chinese old saying that "The 
first generation makes the money, the second spends it and the third loses it" {The Economist, 
2000: 68) clearly reflects the disapproval of the action of selling off family assets and 
property in the region. Thus the ailing firms in North America and Asia are expected to 
response differently with regard to asset disposition: 
Hypothesis 2a. The reduction in fixed asset in North American firms is 
greater than in East Asian firms in a turnaround situation. 
Another explanation for this is weak financial markets for selling corporate assets. 
First, few domestic companies are in a position to buy corporate assets in countries such as 
Indonesia and Thailand. And second, international investors have been hesitant to buy since 
they do not trust the values placed on the businesses that are on sales due to the absence of 
15 The Chinese entrepreneurs tried to transplant their imperial model of business, the "dynastic succession," in 
the West. The founder of Wang Laboratories in Lowell, Massachusetts -- An Wang, promoted his own son 
Fred Wang to President of Wang but the American management group that surrounded Fred did not fully 
accept his inherent right to run the company. This is in stark contrast to the professional managers in the East 
who would follow the Confucian ethics of respect and authoritarianism (Ang et al., 2000) and accept the 
practices as legitimate without questions (see Kao, 1993). 
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reliable analysts and the weakness of corporate disclosure rules (Khanna & Palepu, 1999). 
The higher costs associated with selling assets in East Asia are expected to cut down the 
economic benefits for firms taking such actions and thus have implications on performance. 
Hypothesis 2b. Fixed asset reduction results in greater performance 
improvement among North American firms than among East Asian firms. 
Reduction in Accounts Receivable 
According to the organizational efficiency approach, there are a variety of means by 
which a firm can trim costs. This study focuses on one of the most direct and measurable 
means: reducing the firm's accounts and notes receivable as an operational turnaround 
strategy. The reduction of accounts receivable is frequently promoted in the West as the 
easiest and most direct means by which a firm can cut its costs (Bibeault, 1982). 
Among Asian firms, however, commonly held business practices may make it 
difficult to call in accounts receivable. Under the influence of guanxi and face, the action of 
forcing the collection of overdue accounts from related firms would be interpreted a negative 
action, sometimes even lead to an end of a relationship. Luo and Chen (1996) found that 
credit extension was highly correlated with guanxi relationships. In the presence of guanxi, 
the seller benefits by providing favorable credit terms with extended payment periods 
resulting in concordant sales growth; the buyer benefits from more favorable cash flow 
circumstances and increased operational flexibility through the obligatory reciprocity 
inherent in guanxi networks (Luo & Chen, 1996). Guanxi provides an impetus for building 
sales through long-term accounts payable (Standifird & Marshall, 2000). The non-
confrontational communication style of the people in this region also plays a part for this. 
Even in time of financial difficulty, firms in East Asia are more reluctant to call in overdue 
accounts and notes receivable than their American counterparts. 
On the other hand, the shareholders in the U.S. firms are more powerful. The pressure 
they put on the firms to generate more cash is stronger than that in East Asian firms. As a 
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result these firms will put more effort calling in overdue receivables to generate cash. For 
both reasons it is hypothesized that North American firms are more likely to call in accounts 
receivable under a turnaround situation than are East Asian firms. 
Hypothesis 3a. The reduction in accounts and notes receivable in North 
American firms is greater than in East Asian firms in a turnaround situation. 
Calling in overdue accounts is perceived more positively in the West, and the 
reduction in accounts receivable increase the declining firm's operating cash, it is expected 
that such an action would lead to an improvement in firm performance among North 
American firms. In contrast, the same action is perceived as much more negative among East 
Asian firms. The transaction cost advantage associated with nurturing and maintaining a good 
guanxi with key customers often outweighs the benefit of calling in overdue accounts. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect an opposite relationship to exist among Asian firms. 
Hypothesis 3b. The reduction in accounts and notes receivable results in 
greater performance improvement among North American firms than among 
East Asian firms. 
Sales Improvement 
Improving sales by placing greater emphasis on marketing and sales efforts, 
sometimes at the expense of longer-term investment, is an alternative to reducing costs as an 
operating solution. This operating turnaround action has some potential for East Asian firms. 
However, the troubled firm's financial standing may limit its ability to increase marketing 
expenditures, especially most firms in the East Asia region are of smaller size and thus have 
less slack resources to increase marketing efforts. Additionally, most firms in East Asia do 
not commonly brand products (Kao, 1993; Kraar, 1994) but do original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM) or original design manufacturing (ODM) (Weidenbaum & Hughes, 
1996). The development of such OEM or ODM business-to-business relationships takes time 
to develop. Thus, the ability of many East Asian firms to quickly increase sales through 
increased advertising or promotion is limited. 
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Hypothesis 4a. The increase in sales efforts in North American firms is 
greater than in East Asian firms in a turnaround situation. 
As the potential to increase sales among North American firms is greater, the increase sales 
and marketing efforts are more cost-efficient, thus results in greater boost of firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 4b. The increase in sales efforts results in greater performance 
improvement among North American firms than among East Asian firms. 
Debt Reduction 
Another related implication of family control on turnaround actions is the degree of 
reduction in debt. According to the Western model of turnaround, firms will sell off asset to 
repaid outstanding debt in order to reduce associated interest expense. Firms in Asia, 
however, are less willing to sell off assets. Kraar (1994: 47) observes, "Overseas Chinese are 
decidedly wary of debt. The most treasured asset of any ethnic Chinese businessman is 
xinyong, which means having both a strong reputation and a solid credit rating". This is also 
owing to this group's common heritage as immigrants. The Chinese who left the mother 
country at the bad times in China had to struggle, and that became a culture of its own, passed 
to each generation. Since they have no social security, the Overseas Chinese's habit is to save 
a lot and make a lot of friends (Kraar, 1994). Even though the interest expense is very high, 
they are less likely to sacrifice their assets for the sake of lowering interest expense. 
On the other hand, as Western firms are fairly comfortable with, for example, debt-
for-equity swap, they have additional tools to reduce debt. In contrast, East Asian firms prefer 
to maintain controlling interest. Their means to repay debt is more limited. Also, the 
institutional environment in East Asia has allowed prodigious number of bank loans to one 
firm; this easy money could contribute to decrease in need to reduce debt. For example, at the 
height of the Asian economic crisis, it was found that TPI had borrowed money from 140 
banks in 40 countries. In the three years since he stopped paying TPI's debts, the Chairman, 
Mr. Prachai had not sold a single asset or laid off any workers (Frank, 2001) to help repay 
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part of his debts. The resentment to repay debts in East Asia in extreme cases could be 
expressed in violence -- in March 1999, a Deloitte & Touche LLP accountant in Thailand, 
was gunned down while trying to investigate the debts of a Thai sugar company. Several of 
the company's executives were alleged to hiring the gunmen, but the case has yet to be tried 
(Frank, 2001). Therefore we hypothesize that the degree of reduction in debt will be greater 
in North American firms than in East Asian firm, and there is performance implications. 
Hypothesis 5a. The reduction in debt in North American firms is greater than 
in East Asian firms in a turnaround situation. 
The obstacles involved in calling in overdue debts make this action more costly, sometimes at 
the expense of damaging long-term relationships with major customers. Therefore, such an 
action can be detrimental to firm overall performance improvement. 
Hypothesis 5b. The reduction in debt results in greater performance 
improvement among North American firms than among East Asian firms. 
In summary, the well-regulated, transparent financial markets and dispersed share 
ownership leave the salient agency problem as that between manager and shareholders among 
U.S. corporations. In East Asia, widely held corporations are in the minority, the predominant 
ownership structure being control by a family (Faccio et al., 2001). The salient agency 
problem in these economies is expropriation of outside shareholders by the controlling 
shareholder, particularly when the corporation is affiliated to a group of corporations, all 
controlled by the same shareholder (Faccio et al., 2001), that is, a low ownership to control 
ratio. Insider expropriation is achieved through setting unfair terms for intergroup sales of 
goods and services and transfers of assets and control stakes (Faccio et al., 2001).^^ Figure 3 
encapsulates the institutional contexts in North America and East Asia, and the key 
16 Despite the fact that family control is the predominant form of ownership in both East Asia and Western 
Europe, insider expropriation of minority shareholders' corporate wealth is far more severe in East Asia. 
Faccio and colleagues (2001) in a recent study found that compared to East Asia, the controlling owner in 
Western Europe typically owns a much higher proportion of shares in the corporations that it controls, so it 
has less incentive to expropriate minority shareholders. It also has less scope to expropriate because it has a 
much higher ratio of ownership to control rights. 
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constituencies to satisfy and thus the degree of emphasis on the set of Western-approved 
turnaround actions. 
In the West, the shareholder model of management is prevalent. Firms endeavor to 
satisfy shareholders' demands/expectations. Past research indicates that more radical actions 
such as replacement of chairperson/CEO, reducing fixed assets, receivables and debts and 
increasing sales are key turnaround strategies. In East Asia, minority shareholders are of 
lesser power. As building legitimacy for top managers and controlling family sometimes 
outweighs the interests of the minority shareholders, it hints that these actions may not be the 
primary means for firms to reverse their performance. 
Figure 3. Institutional Contexts and Turnaround Strategies 
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This chapter first presents the research design and then explains the quantitative study 
and qualitative study in details. 
Research Design 
This study combines the quantitative (archival sources) and qualitative (interviews) 
method. Eisenhardt (1989) proposed that theory building in a new research site typically 
combines multiple data collection methods, and research on turnarounds in East Asia 
warrants such a design. The purpose for combining these two methods in this study is twofold. 
First, it is to compliment so that overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon may 
emerge (Creswell, 1994; Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Second, it is to expand, 
wherein the mixed methods add scope and breadth to a study (Creswell, 1994; Greene et al., 
1989), or to identify and amplify relationships suggested by a quantitative study (Lee, 1999). 
In this study, the quantitative part and qualitative part have distinct yet closely related 
research objectives: the quantitative study is to investigate operational actions; qualitative 
study is to investigate strategic actions. The quantitative part of the study utilizing archival 
data is not free from criticism. Archival accounting measures may be biased by a firm's 
choice of accounting practices (Dyl, 1989), and events exogenous to a firm may affect 
market-based performance measures (Gomez-Mejla & Balkin, 1992). To correct this problem, 
this thesis supplements the quantitative study by conducting qualitative interviews, with the 
objective to give substance to the results found in the quantitative study. Institutional theory 
suggests the need for drawing evidence from qualitative and in-depth field methods, and 
quotations from the actors themselves as to how they see their roles (Donaldson, 1995). For 
example, one study by Garud and Rappa (1994) also began with interviews and archival data 
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collection to establish a baseline for the history of technology development in a new field and 
research site. Thus, the two-phase design approach advanced by Creswell (1994: 177; cf. 
Kushman, 1992) was used. 
Quantitative analysis does have potential drawbacks in this context (Pearce & 
Robbins, 1994) such as not providing the richness given by qualitative data. It is expected 
from this initial quantitative investigation of the topic the basis and direction for future 
research on the topic can be built. The qualitative examination conducted after the 
quantitative research will help overcome such shortcomings since it will also provide the 
means to provide a rich interpretation of the quantitative data. It should help insulate the 
overall conclusions from biases in quantitative financial measures that might arise from 
accounting practices and manipulations by controlling shareholders. 
Quantitative Methods 
For quantitative measures, turnaround scholars have noted that identifying the sample 
firms is critical to the insights obtained (Barker & Duhaime, 1997). The greater the validity 
of the sample as true candidates for a turnaround, the greater validity of the insights obtained. 
To establish such internal validity, first it must be clearly established that the firms sampled 
faced true declines. Thus, strict measures of decline were employed. 
The reason Hong Kong and Singapore samples were drawn for this study was that 
Singapore and Hong Kong have rather sophisticated technological infrastructure, and capital 
markets comparable to the West. They also represent two of the three major power centers of 
the Chinese commonwealth (Kao, 1993)•口 Given the relatively free economic system and 
regulations 18, and dominance of Chinese in the economic activities, cultural heritage, and the 
unique historical legacy (being British colonies in the past), the two of the four industrialized 
17 Taiwan is also one of these power centers given its incredible foreign exchange reserves (Kao, 1993). 
18 British law influences both Hong Kong and Singapore. 
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“dragons” 19, Hong Kong and Singapore share many similarities that naturally form them into 
a group for study, and based on their developed status can be compared with the West. 
Sample 
There are two prominent features that must be determined when identifying firms in 
decline. First is the time frame over which a firm must possess certain characteristics in its 
performance to be considered in decline. The second are those characteristics of the firm's 
performance utilized to indicate that it is in decline (Bruton et al., 2001). 
The time frames that prior researchers have used vary widely. This research chose to 
employ a measure that firms with two consecutive years of declining performance were 
included in the sample (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Harker & Sharma, 1999; Pant, 1991; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992) to ensure that the firms studied were truly firms in decline, while at 
the same time to ensure a sufficiently large sample for quantitative analysis. The floating time 
frame, which means an individual firm's potential turnaround period is defined by that firm's 
performance decline, rather than the fixed time frame was used to identify the sample firms. 
The definition was considered sufficiently restrictive in lieu of the fact that over the 23-year-
period (1976-1998) of the study no more than 55 firms were selected in a given year. 
The second issue that must be addressed is the performance measure(s) to be used in 
determining whether the firm is in decline. The strict reliance on financial measures to 
identify firms can be criticized (Bruton et al., 1994). The use of multiple measures, however, 
can provide greater validity in sample selection, which helps overcome such criticisms 
(Venkatramen & Grant, 1986). 
Prior research utilized a wide variety of financial measures previously to identify 
firms in decline. This research chose the most widely previously used measure, return on 
investment (ROI) (Bruton et al., 1994; Bruton et al., 2001; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; 
Robbins & Pearce, 1992). Thus, a firm needs to suffer declining ROI in two consecutive 
19 South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore are called the four industrialized "dragons" of Asia. 
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years to be included in the sample (Bruton et al., 1994; Bruton et al., 2001; Hambrick & 
Schecter, 1983; Robbins & Pearce, 1992). 
This is qualified by one additional measure to increase the validity of the sample. 
Barker and Duhaime (1997) and Barker and Patterson (1996) also required that a firm's 
return on investment be below the risk free rate of return to be included in their sample. The 
rationale is that the ROI of a firm in decline should be lower than what could be earned by a 
risk free investment. It is possible that a firm's ROI may fit the two-year declining criteria but 
still be above the risk free rate of return; such firms were excluded from the sample employed 
here. For the Singapore sample, the average buying rates of Government Securities Dealers 
for 3-month Treasury Bills, as reported in the Monthly Digest of Statistics published by the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore, were used as a proxy for the risk-free rate (see Barker & 
Duhaime 1997). Due to the fact that the bond market in Hong Kong is non-existent, the 
interbank 24-hour offer rates on Hong Kong Dollar deposits, as reported in the Hong Kong 
Monthly Digest of Statistics, were used. In most cases, these rates are available from the 
PACAP database. They were supplemented by data from the monetary authorities of the 
particular countries and Far Eastern Economic Review and some other sources whenever 
possible. Multiple sources were collected to cross-validate the accuracy of the data. 
Hambrick and Schecter (1983) suggested the use of comparative industry data in the 
operationalizations of turnaround situation and turnaround success so as to overcome the 
shortcoming that has weakened pervious empirical research. They called for the use of 
industry-anchored performance measures to facilitate multiple industry studies of turnaround. 
In this study, we required that a firm's return on investment be below the industry median in 
the last year of the decline period to be included in the sample?^ 
20 Some firms are included in the sample even though their ROIs were equal to the industry median because 
they were the only firms in their respective industries, that is, their ROIs equal the industry median ROIs. 
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Additionally, as Barker and Patterson (1996) required, and Barker and Duhaime 
(1997) note, that their entire sample experience a loss during the last year of their decline 
period. For firms to be included in our sample they should also meet the requirement that 
they suffer a financial loss the last year in that two-year consecutive decline period. 
The data sources from which the samples were selected and dependent and continuous 
independent variables were drawn from two databases, the COMPUSTAT for the U.S. firms 
and the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Databases for the Southeast Asian firms. 
Compustat, provided by Standard & Poor,s COMPUSTAT (SPC)，is a database of financial, 
statistical, and market information covering publicly traded companies in the U.S. and 
Canada. It provides more than 340 annual and 120 quarterly income statement, balance sheet, 
statement of cash flows, and supplemental data items on more than 10,000 active and 9,400 
inactive companies. Extensive fundamental financial data on more than 20,000 companies, 
COMPUSTAT is recognized as the industry's premier financial database (Standard & Poor's, 
1999). Company data in the period of 1979 to 1998 were used in this study. 
The PACAP Database consists of 20 years of financial data for listed firms in 11 
countries in the Pacific-Basin region (PACAP Research Center, 1998). While the data files 
are modeled after COMPUSTAT data, the information available is more limited. Company 
data from the period of 1976 to 1998 were used?^ This is a reasonably rigorous, if not the 
best possible source, as it is widely known that empirical materials on Chinese firms in East 
Asia are relatively limited (Yeung, 1999). 
In addition to the financial figures available in these databases, this study was 
supplemented with certain quantitative and qualitative measures retrieved from firm annual 
reports, government documents and other archival sources. 
21 The financial information typically lags by one year in PACAP and COMPUSTAT databases, as well as in 
the company handbooks. 
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Thus the final sample consisted of the U.S., Hong Kong, and Singapore firms that 
suffered a decline in ROI for two consecutive years, with those ROIs being below the risk-
free rate, below the industry median, and having experienced an accounting loss in the last 
22 
year of the two-year decline cycle. A total of 312 companies met the criteria for low 
performance and with sufficient data available for analysis were included in the study. The 
sample included both those companies that subsequently made performance improvements 
and those that did not. 
A primary advantage of ratios is that they can be used to compare the risk and return 
relationships of firms of different sizes (Bruton et al., 2001). Ratios can provide a profile of a 
firm, its economic characteristics and competitive strategies, and its unique operating, 
financial, and investment characteristics. This process of standardization may, however, be 
deceptive as it ignores differences between industries, the effect of varying capital structures, 
and differences in accounting and reporting methods (especially when comparisons are 
international in scope). Given these differences, changes (trends) in a ratio and variability 
over time may be more informative than the level of the ratio at any point in time. 
Measures 
Dependent variables 
The two years following the two consecutive years of decline, called the potential 
recovery period, are examined to determine turnaround outcome. For this a measure of 
adjusted ROI was used. That is, the risk free rate of return for a given year was subtracted 
from that year's ROI for a given firm to produce a measure called adjusted ROI. The 
performance changes are adjusted by the risk free rate of return to ensure that any 
performance improvements are not driven by inflationary gains. The change in adjusted ROI 
22 Bruton and colleagues (2001) carried out this task using 1998 data for Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan 
corporations. The sampling procedure were slightly different from the selection criteria used in this study, 
such as a longer time frame, and no industry-anchored performance data. The present study also extends their 
work to North American corporations and incorporates industry performance benchmarks in selecting the 
sample. 
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between the first year of the period decline and the second year of the potential recovery 
period was used as the dependent variable. The use of such an index like ROI also negates the 
impact of currency differences between the four countries, as well as currency fluctuations 
(Bmton et al., 2001). 
Independent variables 
To test Hypotheses la and lb, data were gathered from each firm's annual report on 
changes in Chairman of the Board and CEO respectively during the last year of the decline 
and the first year of the potential recovery period. The last year of decline and the first year of 
potential recovery were examined, as the Chairman or CEO can be replaced at year-end of 
the first year of decline but for practical reasons does not take over until the first year of 
recovery. CEO change is a dichotomous variable, thus a dummy variable, 0 if the Chairman 
or CEO was not changed during this period and 1 if the Chairman or CEO was changed is 
used. 
Retrenchment through fixed asset reduction (Hypotheses 2a and 2b) during the 
potential recovery period is measured by the percentage change of average fixed assets 
between the decline period and the potential recovery period. The average fixed assets of the 
two years of decline and that for the two years of potential recovery were first calculated 
respectively, and then the percentage change in average fixed assets between these two time 
periods was taken as a measure for reduction in assets. Rather than simply comparing fixed 
assets at the beginning of the decline with that at the end of two years of recovery, this thesis 
examined the percent change in average fixed assets between these time periods so as to 
mitigate any potential temporary wide shifts in asset composition. 
The operational turnaround strategies of decreased accounts and notes receivable 
(Hypotheses 3a and 3b), decreased sales (Hypotheses 4a and 4b) and decreased debts 
(Hypotheses 5a and 5b) were similarly averaged over the decline period and potential 
recovery period respectively, and the percentage change between the two periods taken. In 
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each case, the two-year averages over the decline period and the potential recovery period 
rather than annual figures were used to smooth out noise and transitory factors (Faccio et al., 
2001). The fact that percentage differences were employed for each of these variables also 
negates the impact of currency size differences. 
Control variables 
Firm size. Past research shown that firm size influences the firm's capacity to revive 
itself. The larger the firm, the more slack resources it has, the greater flexibility the firm has 
to trim its assets, accounts and notes receivable, and debts and to increase sales during the 
potential recovery period. Firm size was measured by the natural logarithm of the 
corporation's total assets in the baseline year ~ the year prior to the two-year decline period. 
Industry. It is possible that the industry in which the firm operates impacted its 
performance. Therefore, the sample was subdivided into five different industry groupings 
based on industry classification codes. For the firms in North America, the SIC codes would 
be used while for the firms in East Asia, the codes are supplied through the PACAP databases 
employed in this research to identify the principal industry of the firm. The industry codes of 
the PACAP databases approximate the two-digit SIC codes used in the U.S. The industry 
groups employed were services, finance/real estate, manufacturing, utilities, and 
conglomerates and others. The five industries were dummy coded with manufacturing 
serving as the reference group. 
The analytical methods used in this study were independent samples T-tests and 
hierarchical regression. To test the first part of the five pairs of hypotheses (i.e. la, 2a, 3 a, 4a, 
and 5a), the sample was split into U.S. and East Asian samples and five independent samples 
T-tests were performed to compare significance of the means differences of the five 
independent variables. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test hypotheses lb, 2b, 
3b，4b, and 5b.Hierarchical regressions allow causal priority to be defined and incremental 
validity to be determined. The order in which the predictor variables were entered into the 
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equation was as follows: the control variables were entered in the first step, the independent 
variables the next, and finally the interaction terms, if any, in the third step. 
Qualitative Methods 
Measuring firm response to decline through changes in financial ratios has two 
potential drawbacks (Barker & Duhaime, 1997: 17). First, changes in financial ratios capture 
only what the financial statements can reflect but successful management responses to 
decline may include qualitative changes in firm policies that may affect performance may not 
be reflected in the financial approach (Schendel & Patton，1976: 238). Second, changes in 
financial ratios, especially efficiency ratios, may not represent the management actions that 
researchers attach to them. 
To add substance to the quantitative study based on financial ratios, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted to collect field data to support the findings of the quantitative 
study and to expand the theory by exploring turnaround actions not investigated in the 
quantitative study. Due to the fact that it is seldom possible for an outsider to accurately 
appraise the nature of the poor performance, the inclusion of firm self-appraisal of the cause 
of the turnaround situation was recommended (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983). The top 
executives who were involved in turnaround actions served as the interview subjects. 
Interviews with the big turnaround bankers as well as workout experts were also conducted. 
The interviews formed the basis to provide some confirmation for what the empirical results 
show. 
Organization 
The sampling strategy of this study followed Harris and Sutton (1986) in which a 
diverse sample of turnarounds was chosen. Such variation was needed to help generate theory 
about both constant elements that arise in all or almost all organizational turnarounds and 
variable elements that explain differences among organizational turnaround processes (Harris 
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& Sutton，1986: 8). This theoretical sampling method that chooses cases that are likely to 
replicate or extend the emergent theory as advocated by Eisenhardt (1989: 537) was tightly 
followed. The replication logic was used in looking for “literal replication" (Yin, 1994: 45-
46), that is, similar results of turnaround cases, albeit not all equally successful, but 
reasonably so. 
Informants 
People who made and implemented decisions about an organization's turnaround 
were our primary informant. The number of informants interviewed for each turnaround 
followed the notion of "theoretical saturation" proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967: 61-62); 
the procedure of interviewing additional informants was stopped once the same stories were 
heard repeating over and over again. We invited sixteen people to participate in the study. A 
final sample of twelve agreed to participate. Of these twelve subjects, eight were members of 
the turnaround organizations studied and four were consultants. The consultants included 
workout experts from major banks, big five accounting firms and consulting firms 
specializing in restructuring, turnaround and re-capitalization. 
The well-accepted procedures of building theories from case study research 
recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) were carefully followed. Case studies 
typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and 
observations (Yin, 1994). In this study, we combine archival data with interviews to provide 
triangulation of the turnaround strategies adopted by the East Asian firms. All interviews 
followed the same protocol. The interviews were structured around these general questions of 
turnaround approaches used, along with comparisons and contrasts with the Western model 
of turnaround. Thus interviews were semi-structured around the operational and strategic 
turnaround categories. The interviews lasted from about one hour to over two hours, an 
average interview lasted for one and a half hour. Notes were taken and filled in as soon as 
possible during the interview as well as afterwards (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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According to Dougherty (1992), retrospective interviews have two important sources 
of potential distortion: memory failure and attribution bias. First, to guard against memory 
failure, she recommends people being asked regularly for dates and names to keep them 
grounded in particulars, and one person being re-interviewed briefly to clarify any conflicts in 
reported events. In addition, archival data were reviewed and no conflicts with people's 
stories were found. Second, to check for attribution bias, the uncertain cases were compared 
to the successful and failed turnaround cases (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). The shortcomings of 
retrospective interviews were recognized and controlling procedures carefully followed. 
The data analysis strategy guiding the interviews was to look for commonly repeated 
themes, along with representative quotes. The interview findings were presented in a 




This chapter first presents the results of the quantitative study and then the findings of 
the qualitative study. 
Quantitative Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Using the above-mentioned sample selection criteria, 406 firms were identified as 
facing a turnaround situation. Forty firms were removed due to missing data, thus 366 firms 
were included in the initial descriptive analysis. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of 
firm size measured by total assets the firms possess. Table 6 presents the sectors in which the 
firms engaged. 
Table 5. Firm Size Measured by Total Assets (Millions of U.S. dollars) 
N Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
U.S. 148 8825.28 22391.72 39.28 180236.50 
Hong Kong 152 138.53 397.76 1.24 4570.75 
Singapore 66 507.62 3068.38 2.60 24978.67 
Table 6. Industry by Country 
U.S. Hong Kong Singapore 
Services 16 (10.8%) 5 (3.3%) 22 (33.3%) 
Financial 5 (3.4%) 44 (28.9%) 12 (18.2%) 
Utilities 23 (15.5%) 0 (0%) 1 (1.5%) 
Conglomerate 15 (10.1%) 50 (32.9%) 18 (27.3%) 
Industrial 89 (60.2%) 53 (34.9%) 13 (19.7%) 
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Table 7 presents the means, standard deviation, and correlations for all the variables. 
The Pearson's correlation analysis shows that the coefficients of any single pair of variables 
did not exceed 0.50. Variance inflation factor also did not exceed 2 on any variable. Thus, 
there is no critical multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Region effects on the means 
Table 8 presents the results of independent samples 广-tests testing Hypotheses la, 2a, 
3a, 4a, and 5a respectively. Hypothesis la predicted that a change in Chairperson in East 
Asian firms occurs less often than a change in CEO in North American firms in a turnaround 
situation. In contrast to what is hypothesized, the mean for East Asian firms turned out to be 
higher than that for North American firms (.39 versus .31), but the difference is not 
statistically significant {t = -1.37, n.s.). This implies that North American firms are not more 
likely to change firm principals than are East Asian firms. This contrasts with the belief that 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8. Results of Independent Samples T-tests: Effects of Region ^ 
Means  
Variables U.S. East Asian lvalue Sig.  
Firms Firms (2-taiIed) 
1. Change in Chairperson/CEO 039 -1.37 N.S， 
2. Percentage change in net fixed assets 0.02 0.76 -1.23 N.S. 
3. Percentage change in receivables 0.16 0.20 -.24 N.S. 
4. Percentage change in sales 0.11 0.44 -1.27 N.S. 
5. Percentage change in debt 0.05 1.47 -1.01 N.S. 
6. Firm Size 8.04 4.01 26.45 .000*** 
a For the U.S. firms, n = 126; for Asian firms, n = 187. 
b N.S. = Not significant. 
卞 ； 7 < . 1 0 
* j^<.05 
** p<m 
*** p< .001 
Hypothesis 2a stated that the degree of net fixed asset reduction in East Asian firms is 
smaller than that in North American firms in a turnaround situation. Again, opposite of what 
was hypothesized, the results showed that the mean percentage change in net fixed asset of 
East Asian firms is higher than that of North American firms (.76 versus .02), yet the 
difference is statistically insignificant {t = -1.23, n.s.). This suggests that firms in both regions 
act similarly with regard to asset reduction. Asset retrenchment is likely to be important in 
both regions. 
Hypothesis 3a stated that the degree of reduction in accounts and notes receivable in 
East Asian firms is smaller than that of North American firms in a turnaround situation. The 
results indicate that the means are not statistically significant (.20 versus .16, t = -.24, n.s.). 
The results also suggest that firms in the two regions behave similarly regarding the 
management of accounts receivable in a turnaround situation. 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that the degree of increase in sales in East Asian firms is 
smaller than that in North American firms in a turnaround situation. In contrast to what was 
hypothesized, the mean for East Asian firms is higher than that for North American firms (.44 
68 
versus .11) but the difference is not statistically significant (t = -1.27，n.s.). This again implies 
that firms in the two regions act similarly with regard to boosting sales. 
Hypothesis 5a predicted that the degree of reduction in debt in East Asian firms is 
smaller than that in North American firms in a turnaround situation. To the contrary of what 
was hypothesized, the mean of East Asian firms is higher than that for North American firms 
(1.47 versus .05). The difference is, however, not statistically significant {t = -1.01, n.s.). This 
augurs for the counter-intuitive fact that firms in both regions accumulate rather than reduce 
their debt even though they are undergoing a turnaround. 
Firm size as carrying an alternative explanation 
A further examination of the difference in firm size between East Asian sample and 
North American sample suggests that firm size might have masked the difference in means 
between the two samples. A "test was performed to compare the mean firm sizes in the two 
regions. The results indicate that East Asian firms are significantly smaller than North 
American firms (4.01 versus 8.04, t = 26.45, p < .000). Therefore a series of regressions were 
performed in which each variable in interest in hypothesis la to 5a was served as dependent 
variable in turn, and firm size was served as the predictor variable while region effects were 
controlled for in each regression. Table 9 presents the results. 
In each of the five pairs of models, region effects were regressed on the dependent 
variable in models a, and then the effects of region and later the effects of firm size were 
regressed on the dependent variable in models b. Model lb indicates that firm size has a 
strong negative effect on change in Chairperson/CEO (/5 二 -lYl, p < .05). The larger the 
firm, the less likely the change. Support was found for the effects of firm size on the 
occurrence of change in Chairperson/CEO (AR] = oi5, 4.879,p< .05) regardless of the 
region effects. Therefore, lack of support of Hypothesis la might be attributed to the 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Model 2b indicates that firm size has a negative effect on the percentage change in net 
fixed asset = .062，n.s.) but the results were not statistically significant (AR = .001, AF = 
.461, n.s.). This implies that firm size has no effect on the extent of net fixed asset reduction 
in a turnaround. 
Model 3b indicates that region and firm size both has a strong negative effect on 
percentage change in accounts and notes receivable (/9 = -.221, p < .05 and /3 = -253, p < 
.01 respectively, Ai? = .022, 7.921,/? < .01). Therefore, indirect support was found for 
Hypothesis 3a that East Asian firms have a greater tendency than North American firms to 
reduce accounts and notes receivable but the characteristic of smaller firm size in general 
tends to offset that effect. 
Similarly, Model 4b indicates that region and firm size both has a strong negative 
effect on percentage change in sales {(S = -.281, p < .01 and 二 -.415, p < .001 
respectively, AR^ = .058, AF = 22.003, p < .001). Therefore, indirect support was found for 
Hypothesis 4a that East Asian firms have a greater tendency to reduce accounts and notes 
receivable but the characteristic of smaller firm size in general tends to offset that effect. 
Model 5b indicates that region and firm size has a negative effect on the percentage 
change in debt (/S = -.015, n.s. and (5 = -.083, n.s.) but the results were not statistically 
significant (AR: = .002, AF = .826, n.s.). This implies that the region in which the firms find 
themselves and their size have no effect on the extent of cutback in debt. 
Hierarchical regression analysis was also used to test the Hypotheses lb, 2b, 3b, 4b, 
and 5b so that causal priority can be defined and incremental validity can be determined 
(Cohen & Cohen, 1983). The order in which the predictor variables were introduced into the 
equations were as follows: in each model, the control variables were entered in the first step; 
the independent variables in the second step; and the interaction terms, if any, in the third 
step. 
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Effects of control variables on adjusted ROI 
A summary of the results is presented in Table 10. Model 1 is the baseline analysis of 
the effects of control variables on the change in adjusted ROI. The coefficient of financial 
institutions was significant at the 0.01 level with positive signs. This suggests that in a 
turnaround situation, firms in the financial sector are more likely to have a bigger increase in 
adjusted ROI compared with firms in the industrial sector. Firm size, region and other 
industry control variables such as services, utilities and conglomerates were found to be 
insignificantly associated with change in adjusted ROI. 
Main effects of independent variables on change in adjusted ROI 
Model 2 depicts the main effects of change in Chairperson or CEO, percentage 
change in net fixed assets, accounts and notes receivable, sales and debts on change in 
adjusted ROI. Percentage change in accounts and notes receivable and sales were found to be 
related to the change in adjusted ROI = .02, p < .10 and /3 = -.06, p < .001 respectively, 
M = .24, AF = 20.12, p < .001). Change in Chairperson or CEO, percentage change in net 
fixed assets and debts were found to be unrelated to change in adjusted ROI (/^ = .01, n.s., 
/3 二 .00, n.s., j3 = .00, n.s. respectively). The results imply that percentage changes in both 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interaction effects of independent variables and country on change in adjusted ROI 
Models 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 test each of the interaction effects of the independent 
variables and region respectively. Hypothesis lb stated that change in Chairperson in East 
Asian firms results in smaller performance improvement than that of change in the CEO in 
North American firms. The interaction term of change in Chairperson/CEO and region was 
created and tested in Model 3. Firms were coded 0 if they were North American firms, and 1 
if they were East Asian firms. It was found that the effect of a change in Chairperson/CEO on 
firm performance among East Asian firms was similar to that among North American firms 
(J3 = -.01, n.s., m 2 = .00, AF= .01, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 2b stated that the degree of fixed asset reduction in East Asian firms 
results in smaller performance improvement than that in North American firms. The 
interaction term of percentage change in net fixed assets and region was similarly created and 
tested in Model 4. In contrast to what was hypothesized, the results showed that percentage 
change in net fixed assets resulted in larger performance improvement among East Asian 
firms than it did among North American firms, though the effect was not statistically 
significant�/3 = .07, n.s., b^ = .01, AF= 2.21, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 3b stated that the degree of reduction in accounts and notes receivable in 
East Asian firms results in smaller performance improvement than that of North American 
firms. The interaction term of percentage change in accounts and notes receivable and region 
was tested in Model 5. To the contrary of what was hypothesized, the results showed that 
percentage change in accounts and notes receivable resulted in larger performance 
improvement among East Asian firms than it did among North American firms, though the 
effect was not statistically significant 二 .04’ n.s” = .00, AF= .90, n.s.).Hypothesis 4b 
stated that the degree of reduction in sales in East Asian firms results in smaller performance 
improvement than that of North American firms. The interaction term of percentage change 
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in sales and region was tested in Model 6. The interaction term of region and sales was 
significant {j8 二 .07, 二 .01, AF= 2.9\,p < .10). The regression lines for U.S. firms and 
East Asian firms respectively were depicted in Figure 4. A further analysis discovered that 
the interaction is disordinal (Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 1990). 
Y = a + biXi + b2X2 + b 3X1X2 
Where: 
Y= Change in Adjusted ROI 
a = constant 
Xi = Region, dummy coded 0 for U.S. firms, 1 for East Asian firms 
X2 = Percentage change in sales 
U.S. firms: 7 - 0 . 1 0 - .0.10(0) - 0.13X2 + 0.07(0)X2 
-0.10-0.13X2 
East Asian firms: Y= 0.10 - .0.10(1) - 0.13石 + 0.07(1)X2 
=-0.06X2 
This suggests that an increase in sales is negatively associated with firm performance 
in both regions in general, but the magnitude of the relationship is stronger for North 
American firms than for East Asian firms. This can be attributed to the profitability-sales 
tradeoff relationship, whereas firms try to generate more sales, profitability suffers from 
increased marketing expenditure or slimmer margins. This is even more true to North 
America firms as they tend to rely more on mass marketing which partly explains why the 
regression line is steeper for U.S. companies. 
23 A disordinal interaction is one in which the regression line for one group intersects with the regression line 
for the other group within the range of values being studied. This is also referred to as a crossover interaction 
(Jaccard et al., 1990). 
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Figure 4. Interaction Effect of Region and Sales Efforts on Firm Performance 
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Change in Sales 
Hypothesis 5b stated that the degree of reduction in debts in East Asian firms results 
in smaller performance improvement than that of North American firms. The interaction term 
of percentage change in debts and region was tested in Model 7. To the contrary of what was 
hypothesized, the results showed that percentage change in debts resulted in larger 
performance improvement among East Asian firms than it did among North American firms, 
yet the effect was not statistically significant� /3 = .01，n.s., b^ = .00, AF= .18, n.s.). 
Model 8 represents the full model in which all the control variables, independent 
variables and interaction terms were tested. Firms in the financial sector were found to be 
positively associated with change in adjusted ROI = AO, p < .05). Region was found to 
have effect on change in adjusted ROI {/^ = -.09, p < .10), which means East Asian firms 
resulted in smaller performance improvement than comparable North American firms in a 
turnaround situation. Percentage change in sales was found to be negatively associated with 
change in adjusted ROI = -Al^p < .10). This means increase in sales is associated with 
decrease in adjusted ROI, and vice versa. All other main effects and interaction terms were 
not significantly associated with adjusted ROI (AR: = .01，AF= .64, n.s.). 
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Further Analysis: Region Effects 
As the main purpose of this study is to assess the impacts of institutional 
configurations on firm turnarounds among East Asian firms and North American firms, the 
sample was then spilt into East Asian firms and North American firms and separate 
regressions were performed to assess the region effects. Table 11 summarizes the results of 
regression models for U.S. firms and East Asian firms respectively. 
Table 11. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: By-region Analysis ^ 
U.S. Firms East Asian Firms 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant -.12* M -.15 卞 ^ 
Step 1: Control variables 
Firm size .02** .00 .02 -.01 
Services -.04 -.03 .09 .05 
Finance -.06 -.03 .15* .12* 
Utilities -.03 -.02 .05 .10 
Conglomerate .05 .04 .01 -.02 
Step 2: Independent variables 
Change in Chairperson/CEO .01 .01 
Percentage change in net fixed -.03 .00 
assets 
Percentage change in receivables .02 .02 
Percentage change in sales -.10*** -.06*** 
Percentage change in debt .00 .00 
AR^ .11 .23 .04 .25 
AF 3.05* 8.11*** 1.45 12.21*** 
.11 .35 .04 .29 
Adjusted R^ M .29 m .25 
a Unstandardized coefficients (betas) are reported. For the U.S. firms, n = 125; for Asian 
firms, n = 187. 




Two sub-samples were created in which one group was comprised of East Asian firms 
and the other North American firms. In each sub-sample, the control variables were tested in 
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the first step and then the independent variables added in the second step. The North 
American firms were tested in Models 1 and 2; and East Asian firms in Models 3 and 4. 
For North American firms, Model 1 represents the baseline analysis of the effects of 
control variables on the change in adjusted ROI. The coefficient of firm size proved 
significant at the 0.01 level with a positive sign. This suggests that the larger the firm, the 
larger the increase in adjusted ROI over the potential recovery period of a turnaround 
situation. Other control variables were not found to be significantly associated with change in 
adjusted ROI. Model 2 depicts the main effects of change in Chairperson/CEO, percentage 
change in net fixed assets, accounts and notes receivable, sales and debts on change in 
adjusted ROI. Percentage change in sales was found to be strongly associated with change in 
adjusted ROI = -.10,;? < .001, M �= . 2 3 , 8 . 1 < .001). The results suggest that a 
change in sales has significant impact on firm performance improvement among U.S. firms. 
For East Asian firms, similarly, Model 3 represents the baseline analysis of the effects 
of control variables on the change in adjusted ROI. The coefficient of finance was significant 
at the 0.05 level with a positive sign. This suggested that the financial institutions were more 
likely to experience a greater performance improvement than did the industrial companies 
(i.e., the reference group) in the potential recovery period in East Asia, ceteris paribus. Other 
control variables were found not to be significantly associated with change in adjusted ROL 
Model 4 depicts the main effects of change in Chairperson/CEO, percentage change in net 
fixed assets, accounts and notes receivable, sales and debts on change in adjusted ROI. 
Percentage change in sales was again proved to be strongly associated with change in 
adjusted ROI {JS = - .06,p< .001, AR^ = .25, AF= 12 .2 lp < .001)?^ The results suggest that 
24 A further analysis of a sub sample of firms in which firms with non-ethnic Chinese Chairperson, 
CEO/Managing Director removed suggested that this model is generally applicable to firms in East Asian 
region no matter their principals are of Chinese origins or not. See Appendix 2 for details. 
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in addition to a change in sales efforts has significant impact on turnaround success, financial 
institutions also have a different turnaround path in East Asia. 
In summary, the results of the analysis provided support for the existence of the 
interaction term of region and sales, but no support was found for the other four interaction 
terms. The findings show that firm size and being in the finance sector were effective control 
variables. Reduction in accounts and notes receivable and sales efforts proved to have 
statistically significant impacts on performance improvement in a turnaround situation. Since 
balance-sheet items can be manipulated in favor of the controlling shareholders (Faccio et al., 
2001), and the interaction effects might fail to manifest the region effects, regressions can be 
biased toward finding insignificant results. The effects with particular independent variables 
may not be clearly identified as some of the effects were probably being masked. Past 
research (Schilit, 1993) showed that changes in configurations of hidden variables, for 
instance, hidden assets, may not reflect in financial statements. Barker and Duhaime (1997) 
stated that some hidden strategic variables as well as untested operational ones that are 
affecting turnaround success were not showed in financial reports. Thus interviews with 
workout specialists and management of some East Asian firms that were undergoing 
turnaround, especially firms in the middle of the Asian economic crisis, were conducted to 
see what steps should be taken to for a firm to recover from deep downturn. 
Qualitative Evidence 
The quantitative investigation only supported one of the hypotheses. Barker and 
Duhaime (1997) warn that a strict empirical approach based on financial data may be 
insufficient for understanding turnaround and restructuring actions. They agreed that 
questionnaire and interview data are required to uncover "hidden" strategic and operational 
actions that may not be evident in financial statements. In view of the fact that the 
quantitative data did not confirm many of the hypotheses proposed, a new phase of 
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investigation was undertaken. This comprised semi-structured interviews so as to clarify the 
framework and to uncover missing variables not identified by the initial study (Merton, 1957; 
Sutton & Rafadi, 1988). 
Data Sources 
Case descriptions of the twelve firm turnarounds in East Asia are described in this 
section. They are based primarily on responses to semi-structured interviews. A total of 
twelve interviews were conducted and each interview contained fourteen open-ended, 
specific questions about the turnaround situation the firm encountered, the actions the firm 
took to reverse the performance, the lessons leamt throughout the process, and a comparison 
of turnaround actions in the East and the Wes (see Appendix 1 for the Interview Protocol). 
The firms are based in Hong Kong, Singapore and Thailand; most interviews were conducted 
in Hong Kong. All interview subjects were senior firm managers or turnaround specialists 
involved in consulting restructuring and debt workout. The median tenure of the interviewees 
with their companies was ten years and about seventeen years in the industry. All the 
interviews were transcribed and six were tape-recorded. The rest of the subjects declined to 
be recorded due to the sensitive nature of some of the issues involved. The length of these 
conversations varied from sixty minutes to over two hours; a typical interview was about one 
hour and twenty minutes. Table 12 summarizes the profile of the subjects and firms. 
The interview findings were organized into external and internal issues and are 
presented in the following section. These field data completed the turnaround "East versus 
West" story by uncovering some hidden operational and missing strategic variables not 
available with accounting data from the two databases used in the quantitative study. Being 
“East Asian" has some mixed effects on the turnaround actions and subsequent recovery. 
These are described below. 
25 Interviews were generally conducted on site. Four interviews of Singapore firms were held at The Chinese 
University of Hong Kong / Cornell University Travel Industry Conference in Winter 2001. Other interviews 
were also conducted at the Hofex Convention in Hong Kong in May of 2001. 
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Table 12. Profile of the Firms and Subjects Providing Information on Firm Turnaround 
Experience in 
Company Type of business Person industry or Financial information 
interviewed workout and  
turnaround  
1 Big five accounting firm Consultant 13 years US$ 8 billion annual 
revenue in 2000 
2 Major international Workout 20 years US$ 30 billion annual 
bank specialist revenue in 2000 
3 Asian-based airline Senior planner 33 years US$ 4.4 billion annual 
sales in 2000 
4 Movie entertainment President 17 years US$ 13 million annual 
distribution and sales in 2000 
exhibition 
5 Luxury hotel chain Customer 12 years US$ 400 million 
services annual revenue in 2000 
manager 
6 Business advisory Senior 17 years US$ 120 million 
services / restructuring consultant annual revenue in 2000 
in East Asia 
7 Major Asian bank Workout 18 years US$ 10 billion pre-tax 
specialist profits in 2000 
8 Legal services Lawyer 20 years US$ 20 million annual 
revenue in 2000 
9 Banking Workout 18 years US$ 57 billion sales in 
specialist 2000 
10 Hotel Marketing 14 years US$ 500 million 
Manager annual revenue in 2000 
11 Hotel President and 37 years US$ 30 million annual 
CEO revenue in 2000 
12 ^  Food and Beverages President 20 years US$ 240 million 
annual sales in 2000 
a Data drawn from a talk on turnaround and restructuring in January, 2001, the author briefly 
interviewed the speaker after the talk. 
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External Issues in Effecting Turnaround in East Asia 
Legal framework 
The relatively weak legal framework in East Asia is one culprit repeatedly accused for 
its inability to enforce a liquidation or financial restructuring when it deems necessary 
(Backman, 1999; Frank, 2001). At the World Economic Forum's (WEF) Asia-Pacific 
Economic Summit (APES) in Melbourne in September 2000, Mr. Jack Wadsworth, the 
regional Chairman of Morgan Stanley, reminded the audience that “the legal protections 
offered in the United States and through the litigative environment there, were not available 
in most Asian jurisdictions" (Webb-site.com, 2000). A banker with extensive turnaround 
experience around Southeast Asia and Australia pointed out cultural differences between East 
and West that have a significant impact on firm turnarounds. 
The prime cultural difference is the fact that here [in East Asia, business] 
people are incredibly polite, incredibly cooperative, and non confrontational. 
You see very little emotion, very little attempt by people to use aggressive, say 
body language, language, and any other form of aggression in the context of 
the debtor, creditors side of thing... We ultimately need the cooperation of all 
of the borrowers...We know that the culture here is that if you upset 
somebody then you have upset them for life and then they come back and they 
will never think of you the same way again. ..Your relationship is gone. But if 
we had a legal system that support we will not have to worry about that, we 
can afford to upset people. But we don't [have that legal support] so we don't. 
This summarizes a general challenge companies and managers face in undertaking 
firm turnaround. Legal systems vary greatly around East Asia. Although Singapore and Hong 
Kong have the strongest legal systems in East Asia, commercial law and corporate 
governance tend to be weak in certain areas (Backman, 1999; Young & Chan, 2001). In 
addition, the notion of saving face and maintaining harmony is a cultural element quite 
common among locally run firms in East Asia (Weidenbaum, 1996). The weak judicial 
system, problems with enforcement plus various cultural elements complicate turnarounds in 
the region, even in Hong Kong and Singapore where the legal system is well developed. 
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Internal Issues in Effecting Turnaround in East Asia 
Difficulty in making management changes 
In spite of the absence of quantitative evidence to support the notion that there is 
strong resistance to a change in leadership in East Asian firms, the qualitative evidence does 
provide support for this view. A banker at a major Hong Kong bank concurred his 
observations in the region: 
A lot of companies are still family owned and family controlled even if they 
are listed companies and seem to be in the public domain. 
A lawyer from a major regional law firm provided further support of this view: 
Most public companies in Asia, we all know, are run by families, family 
businesses and they still control the majority of the stock, either directly or 
through friends, acquaintances, nominees...So if you are dealing with these 
entrepreneurs who put all the family money into the particular enterprise then 
they are protective of it and they don't give up easily. My approach is you 
can't go in with jet boots on, and pretend you can kick the CEO out. It just 
doesn't work that way [in this region]. 
Anand Aithal, a regional analyst with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. neatly encapsulated 
the issue as “[i]t,s very hard to remove these managements in [East] Asia" (Frank, 2001: Al). 
The obstacle to initiating management changes is due to three factors. First and the foremost, 
as most of the subjects agreed, many local owner/managers are unwilling to give up control 
over the firms even if they are proven inept at restoring the firm. Typically a single 
owner/manager dominates the upper echelon of firms in East Asia and this creates 
complications to effecting management changes (Backman, 1999; Weidenbaum & Hughes, 
1996). 
Thai Petrochemical Industries Inc. (TPI) is almost a textbook case of the lack of 
control debtors, the board and minority shareholders have over the Chairperson/CEO in a 
turnaround situation not only in Thailand but also in many East Asian countries around the 
region (Backman, 1999; Clifford & Engardio, 2000; Frank, 2001). Thai Petrochemical is one 
of Thailand's major industrial conglomerates and a major employer there. TPI was also 
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Thailand's biggest defaulter on $3.5 billion of debt, during the Asian economic crisis. TPI's 
chief executive, Mr. Prachai Leophairatana, has maneuvered to stay in charge, despite the 
innumerous attempts by the firm's creditors to oust him and install a new management team. 
An historic court-ordered restructuring and upholding of Thailand's new bankruptcy laws and 
commanding him to step down in favor of the new management and workout team has not 
changed the situation (Rohwer, 2000; Frank, 2001; Young & Chan, 2001). This is in sharp 
contrast to the scene in the West where incompetent CEOs are expected to step down to 
restore the credibility of the management team and improve performance (Collins, 2001). 
One workout specialist observed: 
[T]here is enormous sensitivity to loosing management control [in East Asia: 
and so they would say, “well, I accept that I'm going to get below 50% but 
there is no [damn] way I'm giving up management control. 
A restructuring expert added. 
[To dilute ownership stakes was] almost impossible... I mean it is the whole 
Asian way of thinking. If you are the owner you have status and once you are 
not the owner it is a big problem because many, many people will defer 
forever. I think this is because if you lose any equity you lose face. 
Second, the inside board members and top executives are reluctant to go against the 
wishes of the incumbent owner/manager (Allen, 2000). Many of them are family members, 
close business associates of the owner/manager who are loyal and submissive to the 
owner/manager's authoritative rule. Also, the legitimacy of the owner managing the firm is 
seldom, if ever, questioned by subordinates in Asia. In the TPI case, the workers remained 
loyal to the founder even though by law he was fired as chief executive (Frank, 2001). The 
non-confrontational orientation in East Asian, especially Confucian societies represents 
another life raft for the owner/manager (Weidenbaum & Hughes, 1996). An Executive 
Chairman of an international food and beverages corporation based in Hong Kong conceded 
that at the time the company was in crisis, he never felt any pressure to resign during that 
time: 
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The only action that the members on my board, many of whom are actually 
my family members or close business associates, could take in the middle of 
the crisis was nothing but to stand aloof from me and let me run the firm my 
way. 
A third reason for the reluctance of the management to initiate change is that they are 
too circumspect about the potential loss incurred in forcing out the owner/manager, which is 
not without ground. From the guanxi perspective, the step down of the chairperson signifies a 
termination of his guanxi with the firm, along with the outside network he established for the 
firm. The reluctance of the board or the management to force the chairperson's resignation is 
due to the reluctance to sacrifice the sunk investments in an existing guanxi relationship with 
the firm and outside parties, and the near impossibility of restoring a guanxi relationship that 
has been jeopardized (Standifird & Marshall, 2000; Yau, 1988). One banker explained the 
potential loss of forcing the resignation of the owner/manager: 
If you liquidated you didn't get any value and there were a lot of [assets], and 
the owners had a lot of contacts. So if you got rid of them [top management] 
then you lost a large part of the business. 
The owner/manager' s experience and connections are irreplaceable, especially in East Asia 
where legitimacy, seniority and long-term trust building is highly prized (Ahlstrom & Bmton, 
2001). The above three reasons illustrate the difficulty in making management changes. No 
wonder observers commented that mighty Asian tycoons operate their businesses a little more 
like their empires (The Economist, 2000). In addition to difficulty in making management 
changes, the next section discusses how the operational steps in turning companies around in 
East Asian differ from that in North American. A number of firms mentioned that in spite of 
constraints, a number of operational steps were available to improve firm performance. 
Operational Turnarounds 
Asset retrenchment strategies 
Financial restructuring involving taking major write-offs of assets is common among 
North American firms. Retrenchment in assets faces stronger resistance, especially from 
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owners, in the East Asian region (Young & Chan，2001). Owners in general are reluctant to 
trim assets by selling off non-core assets. A workout specialist reflected: 
The owner/manager develops [his firm], he doesn't want to sell anything. He 
doesn't sell his oil tankers. He has an interest in the oil company. He doesn't 
see any merit in selling off his tanker family, his electrical generation plants, 
and, you know he doesn't sell anything...and he certainly doesn't recognize 
the rights of creditors to be repaid.. .You try and educate [him about his] and it 
is just no, in one ear and out the other. 
Managers stated that the firm principals treated their companies like family jewels ~ 
something to be admired and polished ~ but never to be broken up. In the infamous TPI case, 
Mr. Prachai was particularly upset about plans to sell non-core assets to help repay part of the 
company's debts (Kazmin, 2000: 20). Another debt-ridden Thai corporation, Charoen 
Pokphand Group, its chairman Mr. Dhanin Chearavanont was unwilling to give up control 
over assets his family has been amassing for some eighty years (Balfour, 2001). Others did 
manage to delay the delivery of new assets. Stated a senior manager of a major Asian airline: 
We sought to delay the delivery of planes therefore reducing our increasing 
fixed assets, but we were unable to delay this too long without penalty from 
Boeing and Airbus. Finally we decided to take delivery after stalling Boeing 
and Airbus four a time. The problem in the airline business is that once you 
have planes, you need to put that plane in the air. Because we had to take 
delivery of the new planes, we decided to take 13 older planes out of service, 
actually they were only about 12 years old, but we felt we had no choice. We 
were able to lease some of those planes to other carriers (and had to write 
them down) and parked one [in the desert] in Victorville, CA...It’s though to 
cut capacity in airline business but sometimes you can reduce fixed costs or at 
least slow the planned increase. 
Still some others achieve this sometimes by less conventional means, especially when 
hidden assets are involved, which are not reflected in the balance sheet. Delaying big 
purchases was a common strategy mentioned by several managers and consultants as well. 
Shifting assets temporarily to another sister firm was also mentioned, sometimes using 
related network firms controlled by the senior owner/manager (Faccio et al., 2001). This is 
also consistent with network strategies in China discussed by Peng and colleagues (Peng, 
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2000; Peng & Heath, 1996), and in Overseas Chinese firms (Backman, 1999; Faccio et al., 
2001; Seagrave, 1995). 
Cost cutting strategies 
Reduction in receivables. The emphasis on guanxi connections in Chinese 
communities plays a pivotal role in the relationship maintenance of customers and 
distributors. The longer-term orientation of the Chinese business people compared to those in 
the West (Bond, 1988, 1996) tends to favor the maintenance of an amicable relationship 
between buyers and sellers developed over years rather than discrete transactions based on 
contractual obligations (Weidenbaum, 1996). They are willing to delay calling in of overdue 
payments even if they are in difficult times because the behavior of following up too closely 
on late payments when the customers are facing cash shortfalls is not socially approved. Also 
the alienation of clients when they are in difficult times may prove disastrous to one's success 
in the future because the clients may never turn to you again when they are recovered later 
(Ang et al., 2000). With this consideration in mind，firms in East Asia have a credit extension 
policy that differs from that of the North American firms. Observed Standifird & Marshall: 
In China, where the guanxi network is deliberately nurtured and the 
preservation of amity is of the utmost importance, sellers will make every 
effort to avoid embarrassing customers who confront temporary cash 
shortages. Credit is extended as a way for both the seller and buyer to maintain 
an amicable relationship. The probability that those receiving credit will act 
opportunistically towards those extending credit is attenuated by the socially-
constructed face preservation mechanism associated with the well-developed 
guanxi networks" (Standifird & Marshall, 2000: 33). 
Luo added: 
Another major gwam:/-associated business variable is credit-extension in 
commercial activities. This credit-granting practice is, at least to some extent, 
a reflection of culture. In a country where guanxi relationships are 
painstakingly nurtured and the maintenance of harmony is of paramount 
importance, sellers would do their utmost to avoid embarrassing customers 
who may be temporarily unable to pay (Luo, 1995). For buyers, those who 
have maintained more extensive guanxi networks in purchasing activities are 
likely to have a higher intensity of accounts payable and accordingly gain 
more from the extension of commercial credit. For sellers, those who have 
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maintained a better guanxi network in marketing activities are expected to 
achieve a higher performance in terms of domestic sales growth" (Luo, 1997: 
55). 
The notion of maintaining amicable relationships among business partners not only 
when times are good but also when times are bad is upheld painstakingly in East Asia. The 
Chinese saying, ''gong du shi jian,” which means "passing the difficult times together" 
reflects this conviction. Some managed to use this to withhold the long-term relationship with 
their distributors and retailers during product disruption, which is difficult to establish in the 
first place. A chairman of a food and beverages manufacturer that underwent the crisis of 
food poisoning and thus product recall recollected the situations: 
At the time we recalled our products from the shelves [in a food poisoning 
crisis], we didn't directly pay back our customers or our retailers in cash. 
Instead we issued redemption coupons to them. In this way, we didn't cut off 
the relationship with either the distributor or the customers. Therefore, we had 
no difficulties re-launching the products as we would have if we cut the 
relationship in the first place. If we did, we would have had to renegotiate for 
the shelf space with the retail stores just like a brand new product launch does. 
The President of a major Asian film studio also agreed with this assessment: 
But significant operational change here is difficult to implement, it's hard to 
call in accounts receivable: that guy may be a distributor or cinema that you 
have been working with for years. Remember the Hong Kong film industry is 
quite localized and often family-based, family-run. You might compare it to 
the old Hollywood days [in the 1930s and 1940s] of the studio moguls. They 
ran those studios with an iron hand, telling everyone what to do — the crews, 
the stars, sometimes even the directors, they micro managed. In terms of 
external relationships with other organizations, so much is based on trust, 
acquired over time. This makes it hard to change when times are tough — they 
do not want to reduce staff, change top management or jeopardize outside 
relationships with tough measures and cost cutting. But by 1998, it had to be 
done. We tightened production costs considerably and had to get paid faster 
from our customers and distributors. It was tough, but we had no choice. It 
may be easier for outsiders [to the film industry] like myself to undertake 
stringent cost measures. 
Insisting on stringent cost measures such as calling in overdue receivables may invite 
opposition from customers and distributors. But the business climate is changing — people in 
East Asia are pragmatic and reasonably aware of the tough times everyone in the region is 
suffering from, especially in the post 1997 period, and are gravitating toward the "matter-of-
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fact" Western management style. It is also attested by the happenings of downsizing after the 
crisis in the region. 
Reduction in debt. While debt-for-equity swap is a fairly common debt workout 
plan, it is not that well received in East Asia. In the TPI case, its some 140 creditors reached 
consensus to convert US $ 756 millions of unpaid interest into a 75 percent shareholding in 
the company under a debt-for-equity swap. Mr. Prachai, whose stake in TPI has been reduced 
to about 15 percent from about 60 percent, appealed to the bankruptcy court but was 
overruled. Anand Aithal, regional analyst with Goldman Sachs Group Inc. commented, 
“[East Asian economies] have a system where companies can go on accumulating debts 
indefinitely" (Frank, 2001: Al). 
Labor reduction exercises. Human resources management represents another critical 
area to trim fat in a turnaround. Despite the fact that cutting head count is in many cases 
inevitable, interview data confirmed over and over again that if the firm communicates its 
difficult situation to the staff in a transparent and timely manner, it can actually alleviate the 
ill-feeling of the staff, whether or not they will remain on the team. The manager of a major 
hotel in the region recalled: 
Our people management philosophy and system also changed [after the Asian 
economic crisis]. Two years ago, we launched the 'core competencies 
program' — to recognize the local talent and to cut cost...We made it clear 
that it's a bad time and we were ‘on the same boat'. We were not able to raise 
their salary, yet we needed to work as a team to weather the downturn and to 
protect our ‘rice bowls'. We shared with them how far the hotel was behind 
industry recovery and made everything as transparent as possible. And we are 
glad that after some 12 years, more than 30% of our staff that started their job 
here at that time still remain here -- quite an encouraging figure. 
Also, the importance of creating career alternatives for the staff cannot be 
underestimated in improving productivity (cf. Weldon & Vanhonacker, 1999). Counseling 
the dismissed workers in the job searching process, helping them to land a new job, or even 
encouraging them to establish their own ventures, are proved not only effective in alleviating 
the hostility of the displaced employees toward the firm but also in some cases may be 
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advantageous to the firm because this helps secure reliable partners for future outsourcing. 
The hotel manager explained this well-thought-out policy: 
During the downturn], we had no option but to sack about a hundred staff. 
We outsourced our limousine service to a company under the condition that it 
would buy all our limousines and hire the drivers we sacked...We had had an 
in-house creative department to design menus, ballrooms decorations, etc. All 
were dismissed except two. We persuaded them to register a new company 
and we gave them all our business [related to creative works]. Shedding staff 
was an unavoidable fact [in a turnaround], but we always tried to provide 
some alternatives for the staff that need to leave to reduce their ill feelings 
toward the hotel. Every time we talk to them we make sure the presence of 
managers of both gender to make clear no sex discrimination issue was 
involved. 
Firms cannot re-commit afford to ignore the human side of management, sacrificing 
intangible goods such as commitment and loyalty of staff to short-term efficiency or profit 
boost. Treating the staff as long-term partners and allocating resources to developing them 
and hopefully improving productivity is a core concept of this policy (Brenneman, 1998). 
Another tricky area in staffing is the hiring of family and relatives of the controlling family. 
While this is still a part of the culture its predominance is expected to fade away (Ang et al., 
2000). On the other hand, maintaining a flexible cost structure is crucial as always. The 
President of a film studio in the region reckoned: 
We are selective in our hiring trying not to hire friends and relatives as much. 
This reflects the old family business orientation of the film business in Hong 
Kong. But I would say now those days are passing. The film business has a 
number of nimble smaller studios that can form quick alliances, flexibly hire 
and put a production together quickly, using different directors and stars. 
While the studio system in Hong Kong will not fade away yet ~ it's still not 
nearly as expensive to maintain as talent and production as in Hollywood ~ 
this flexibility in HR and speed to production is crucial. It allows us to have a 
more flexible cost structure, which is key for weathering downturns. You may 
not grow as fast with this structure, and you have to share revenue with your 
alliance partners, but financial flexibility, creative scope and production and 
distribution breath is significantly greater. This has played a major role in our 
restructuring and turnaround process. 
The virtue of shedding staff in a turnaround plan is self-evident both among East Asia 
firms and North American firms. With the aid of qualitative interviews, however, the not-so-
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obvious advantages of creating career alternatives for lay-off staff also become explicit, 
which the empirical data did not cover. 
Controlling purchases and other expenses. When the firms are hit by the downturn, 
they tightened their belts. Managers are told to be more prudent in purchasing equipment and 
controlling spending in the relentless swim-or-sink reality. The hotel manager elucidate the 
situation: 
We are now careful in our spending. In the heydays, we were pouring money 
like water. Now we encourage our staff to entertain our [corporate] clients at 
our own hotel instead of outside. We also asked them to avoid ordering 
anything unnecessary. You may order orange juice for guests, that's fine. But 
if distilled water is okay, then distilled water. People all understand it's a hard 
time for everyone. When times are good, we purchased not what is suitable 
but the best. For example when we bought a stereo system for the coffee 
lounge, we simply ordered the best. However, customers could not tell the 
difference if it's a Sony or an Aiwa anyway. Now, or those that are visible and 
customers can feel, we are happy to spend money on, but for those that makes 
no difference in customers' eyes, we avoid spending on it. We used to provide 
the most towels in our rooms among all hotels ~ but that's unnecessary. 
This is an interesting dilemma in cost cutting, even in a well-differentiated firm. Cuts 
can be made, services reduced, substitutions of goods made to reduce cost as part of a 
turnaround effort. But as the former longtime CEO of American Airlines once commented --
you have to do this cost cutting year by year. "Sooner or later you will take out things the 
customer does value. Then you have to put those that customers value back." But there is no 
substitute for that cost-cutting vigilance (Porter, 1988). 
The tactics in reducing assets, cutting costs, downsizing the workforce, and 
controlling expenses discussed above are not purely operational. They can be strategic and 
crucial to firms' long-term survival and success if used in the right mix. The following 
section discusses how companies undertook strategic turnaround caused by external factors, 
drawing on interview data to elucidate. 
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Strategic Options in Turnaround 
Revenue-building strategies 
Generating new revenue is usually integrated into the overall strategy in the recovery 
stage, which is driven by strong marketing efforts. This can be achieved through various 
ways such as expanding the sales force, repositioning the existing products, and introducing 
new products, that may or may not involve strategic elements. The firms interviewed 
explored various means to discover new avenues to boosting sales. Creating more value for 
customers is one of the ways to boost the sales figure. A major hotel in the region explained: 
For revenue building, we tried to provide value-added services instead of 
lowering prices to attract customers. For instance, we used to charge guests 
for making local phone calls but now it's for free. This adds value to 
customers but virtually costs us nothing. Besides, we cut the room rate for 
weekends to lure people to stay a little longer...For revenue management, we 
sized/capitalized on every opportunity. Three years ago, we started to launch 
the 'rate of the day’ program. People coming to stay at our hotel at different 
days of the week are charged different room rates... Just like what the airline 
industry did, we improved our forecast system. Now we have more accurate 
forecasts and so we plan better...Our focus is not to develop new accounts but 
to retain the existing ones. 
They also changed their philosophy in managing relationship with customers. They make 
customer-orientation bigger than ever. 
In the early 1990s, we had very bad relationship with customers. During the 
peak seasons, our account executives took orders only. If the clients were 
unhappy about the price or the package, we just let them go since our hotel 
was already fully booked. After 1997, however, we became more customer-
oriented. We refocused on building relationship with clients. This year [2000] 
represents a big challenge for us. The economy has recovered and more 
customers are returning. On the one hand we know we can and we need to 
charge more, but on the other hand, we don't want to jeopardize our 
relationship with clients which we strived so hard to build in the first place. 
Hence, we sent our account executives to talk to our big accounts. We 
proposed a rate for them and let them give feedback. In the old days, there was 
no way for negotiation, we set the price and the customers had to accept it 
whether or not they liked it, or they had to go for another hotel. 
The way they deal with their distribution channels also changed as a result. The same hotel 
manager reflected: 
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The way we manage our relationship with the travel agents is that we didn't 
provide discount to our agents because we believe that even if we did, the 
discount wouldn't be passed onto the customers. The travel agents would still 
charge the customers the same price and just pocket the money themselves. 
Instead, we give them some extra rooms as sales bonuses if they reach the 
targets we set. Say, if 40 rooms were being reserved through them, we gave 
them four extra rooms for free which they could decide what to do. Usually 
they would sell them at normal rate to customers and earn more money. For us 
this doesn't involve any extra costs as the hotel rooms are anyway here, no 
matter whether they were occupied. It's a strong incentive for our agents to 
meet the sales goal though. We are mobilizing them to generate more business 
for us -- we call it knock-back. 
With creativity and enterprise, these tactics are at one's disposal to boost sales and to 
cultivate better relationships with customers and distribution channels. 
Going online as a response to the downturn 
While firms might only focus on either reducing assets or trimming costs in the 
retrenchment stage, they tend to use a wider range of measures in the recovery stage, usually 
involves a combination of assets reduction and cost cutting measures along with strategies to 
generate more revenue. Strategies involving redirection of the company's efforts are crucial 
to a company's long-term profitability if the existing strategies prove ineffective or obsolete. 
In these cases, careful analyses of the company, customers and competitors are essential in 
devising sound strategies. In addition to undergoing a range of cost-cutting measures across 
the organization, the regional airline interviewed in this study also managed to improve their 
hub-and-spoke system to provide better connections for their passengers. This helps 
repositioning the airline to differentiate from its prime competitor, another highly successful 
region airline. In addition, this airline joined a major airline alliance to split some operating 
costs with other carriers and to broaden their coverage of routes. 
On other strategic fronts they are changing the way they distribute their products. 
Both the airline and several hotels are working with travel agencies to start online travel 
services. The airline starts offering e-tickets and the hotel's online reservation is generating 
profit. The airline manager explained: 
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We will be working with a Pan-Asia travel portal with nine other airlines and 
two service providers to offer the online travel services. We will also work to 
develop some B2B [business-to-business] services to promote our increased 
capacity in cargo and logistics via our website...Another thing we're doing is 
improving the in-flight facilities. Internet access will be the next big thing for 
the future...Internet access for us is an important service to offer and we 
believe these new services are helping to enhance customer loyalty. 
One of the hotels we interviewed also explored the advantages of online reservation system: 
We rolled out the first real-time online reservation system in the world. The 
downturn posed the urgency for us to build the system. First, nowadays more 
and more young executives are comfortable buying on-line...Second, it's a 
way to gradually breaking up with the travel agents. We pay the travel agent 
ten percent commission every business they bring in — that's quite a lot. If 
[our customers] reserve on-line, we don't need to give commission [to the 
agents]. 
Summary 
Rather than any single form of the above strategies dominating the field, combination 
strategies are probably the most common form of response especially tailored to tricky 
strategic challenges stem from the competitive landscape, though they can appear in a myriad 
of forms. Purely operational measures appear more frequently in turnaround handbooks than 
in the business realm ~ particularly when the whole region was hit by the downturn — as 
evident in the interview data. Table 13 encapsulates the qualitative evidence about the 
similarities and differences of turnaround actions between the U.S. and East Asia, divided 
into management changes, operational and strategic aspects. To summarize, the qualitative 
evident showed that while traditional turnarounds tactics such as installing new management 
team, trimming assets, reducing accounts receivable, restructuring debt, and generating more 
sales are still important in East Asian turnaround, their roles as effective turnaround actions 
are less pronounced than in the West. This is a result from the various regulatory, normative 
and cognitive forces that are different to those in the U.S. Besides, some turnaround actions 
that are either unique to East Asian firms characteristics or as responses to growth of 
electronic commerce were identified in the interviews. 
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Table 13. Qualitative Evidence about Turnaround in East Asia 
Conventional Findings through interviews with 
ideas East Asian managers  
Making Top management headed The rule of the firm patriarch ~ the 
management by CEO were forced to chairperson of the board as well as the 
changes resign because of managing director ~ buttressed by family 
management failures, members and close associates installed in 
finding a scapegoat for prominent positions in the firm, is 
the decline and showing considered legitimate and seldom 




• Asset Selling off non-core Firm assets are considered jewels — to be 
reduction assets was considered a polished but not to be broken up. Asset 
simple and direct way to retrenchment faces stronger resistance from 
resume positive cash the family-controlled management because 
flow. they are unwilling to give up their empires. 
• Receivables Calling in overdue Firms were reluctant to call in receivables 
reduction accounts receivable was as this may jeopardize the amicable long-
an effective cost cutting term relationships with customers, which 
tactic. are difficult to establish in the first place. 
• Revenue Revenue building is a As East Asian firms have less available 
generation core strategy in firm's funds, their ability to increase sales efforts 
long term recovery. is somewhat more limited. 
• Debt Firms in distress were The institutional settings allow firms to 
Restructuring under strong pressure to borrow from a prodigious number of banks 
repay debts, both by and to delay debt repayment. Though this 
creditors and banks who questionable practice is fading away as the 
wanted to reduce the risk banking sector in many East Asian 
of accumulating bad countries called for stronger governance 
debts, and by and control after the financial crisis, this 
shareholders of the firms together with the unpopularity of debt-for-
who want to reduce the equity swap is still limiting firm's options 
firm's interest expense. in debt restructuring. 
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Table 13. Qualitative Evidence about Turnaround in East Asia (continued) 
Conventional Findings through interviews with 
ideas East Asian managers 
Strategic 
turnaround 
• Combination Combination strategies that East Asian managers reflected that for 
strategies appear in a myriad of forms ^ turnaround plan to be effective, a 
are effective for strategic combination of both operational and 
turnaround. Purely strategic actions is often required, 
operational measures feature 
more in turnaround textbooks 
than in the business realm. 
• Product Re-defining product markets This is proved true in East Asian firms 
repositioning and refocusing on profitable as well. 
markets are effective 
turnaround strategies. 
• Strategic Cutting head-counts and East Asian firms were cautious in 
human hiring people strategic to making changes in human resources 
resources firm's competitive management. They made changes in 
management advantages are commonly compensation but with an eye toward 
promoted m turnaround carefully managing layoffs, changes in 
plans. supplies and so forth, which are 
consistent with the ingrained notion of 
maintaining important guanxi 
networks. 
• Internet The Internet provides a new East Asian Firms are also looking 
strategies means to streamline beyond conventional advertising 
operations, cut costs and media and distribution channels to 
reach more potential find new ways to appeal to consumers 
customers. and the Internet is among them. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Internal organizational efficiency and institutional views of legitimacy building are 
essentially two complementary perspectives, thus organizations are both institutions and 
instrumentalities (Scott, 1987). Each of these two conceptual frameworks “consists of a 
cluster of assumptions and categories that influence" researcher and managers' decision-
making - “wha t ones find puzzling, how ones formulate the question, where ones look for 
evidence, and what ones produce as an answer" (Allison, 1971: 245). Different "conceptual 
lenses" address different facets of the phenomenon in question; the institutional theory and 
organizational efficiency perspective are two lenses that reflect a wide spectrum of 
turnaround actions happening in East Asia. 
The findings of this study showed that while firms in the U.S. and East Asia generally 
put improving organizational efficiency among firms' top agenda, East Asia firms may have 
an additional set of calculations ~ maintaining legitimacy for controlling family and guanxi 
networks __ which have strong bearing on turnaround actions. Thus, while they worked to 
improve financial performance, East Asia firms also strive to maintain controlling families' 
legitimate control and important guanxi networks with firms' important constituencies at the 
same time, even at the expense of minority shareholders if deem necessary. The hit of the 
Asian economic crisis 1997-8 exposed the cronyism, legitimacy and empire building 
activities in East Asia. In the wake of the financial crisis, the loss of foreign investor's 
confidence in the region has called for corporate governance reforms and protection of the 
rights of minority shareholder and investors. Also, the Western-educated successors of these 
tycoons are generally more receptive to Western management styles and international 
corporate governance standards. However, the deeply ingrained practices of these powerful 
firm patriarchs are unlikely to change overnight. 
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The primary contribution this thesis makes is to advance this stream of research 
beyond any single country setting and link the literature on turnaround with the context of the 
institutional frameworks in the East Asia (cf. Peng & Heath, 1996). Through such 
multinational triangulation efforts (Peng & Heath, 1996), the components of institutional 
frameworks critical to a theory of turnaround in East Asia will be identified. The second 
contribution is to advance this stream of research through a direct comparison of the 
strategies adopted by successful and failed turnaround cases to shed light on strategies that 
have high propensity to success. Finally，this thesis provides a retrospective review of the 
turnaround cases in the post-1997 period as an account for deeper understanding of strategies 
that enabled firms to weather the downturn. 
The legitimacy considerations in firm turnaround in East Asia still remain to have 
strong implications for theory and practice. 
Implications 
Implications for Theory 
From the theoretical perspective, this research represents one of the early attempts to 
investigate the East Asian turnaround strategies. The overriding managerial implication of 
this study is the recognition of institution's continued influence on impetus of turnaround 
efforts. The failure to recognize and appropriately assess the perseverance of the differences 
induced by institutional environment can have a devastating effect on managers attempting to 
invest in East Asian firms and to turn the firms around. 
This research is a timely response to the call for increasing needs to understand how 
East Asian firm turnaround in the aftermath of Asian economic crisis in 1997-8 by examining 
the turnaround strategies adopted by them in the past two decades. It is among the first 
studies to directly discuss the differences of the turnaround strategies adopted by firms in the 
U.S. and East Asia and to empirically test it in one single study. It tested whether the 
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American-made theory of turnaround is applicable to the East Asian contexts, drew 
researchers' attention to the unique institutional contexts in East Asia that have implications 
for turnaround actions，and proposed some thoughts on future development of theories to 
explain turnarounds in East Asia. 
Organizations need to unlearn from time to time to avoid organizational crises. 
(Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984; Starbuck, 1983). The institutional environment in East Asia is 
also evolving and changing. As economies in East Asia are recovering from the crisis, they 
are recollecting the lessons leamt. Faced with the hostile economic forces and threats of 
survival, firms are unlearning the taken-for-granted practices and subscribing to Western 
style of efficiency-oriented approach. For example, the thirteenth month bonus and seniority-
based salary, once considered sacrosanct in Chinese communities, are no longer 
automatically granted in the hotel industry in Hong Kong. A founder and president/CEO of a 
hotel group that manages multiple properties in Asia remarked: 
Hong Kong people are realistic and pragmatic. They understand that both 
employers and employees are facing the economic difficulties -- no one is the 
sole winner. They are willing to accept reduced salary and perquisites and 
share burden of the sweeping [Asian] Economic Crisis [1997-8]. 
In explaining turnaround of Overseas Chinese firms, researchers need to pay attention to 
firm-specific strategies as well as to changing regional institutional contexts in which firms 
are embedded and strategies are implemented. Among the biggest challenges for Hong Kong 
and Singapore after the Asian economic crisis was to provide a burgeoning business 
environment with effective corporate governance mechanism for foreign investors. After the 
Asian economic crisis, the region has been unlearning the used-to-be weak corporate 
governance practices. The governments and business sector of many East Asian countries 
have realized that their countries are risking long-term competitive position in the 
international financial market if they remain lagged behind in the enforcement and 
compliance of international governance standards. Governments of those crisis-affected 
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countries have thereby put corporate governance reforms among their top agenda (Asian 
Development Bank, 1998). Hong Kong and Singapore are leaping forward to the standards 
set in the U.S., Australia and Europe. Two forces are in motion to improve corporate 
governance in Hong Kong. First, the inception of the Mandatory Provident Fund scheme 
creates potential powerful institutional investors and bond holders that have more bargaining 
power to stipulate for companies to have good corporate governance. Second, after the Asian 
turmoil, the syndicated loan providers, bankers or bondholders have become more cautious in 
approving loans or making investments. They may well start making corporate governance a 
condition for loans (Rogers, 2001). A number of associations and committees have thrived to 
wave the corporate governance flag -- the Institute of Directors, the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants, the Asian Corporate Governance Association, to name just a few. The advocacy 
of the formation of the Hong Kong Association of Minority Shareholders to support 
shareholder activism is a timely response to the call for deterrence of minority shareholder 
abuse and incentivization of international corporate governance standards. This association 
would act as a voice for minority shareholders to lobby for legal reforms, rate companies on 
governance and mount quasi-class action suits against the worst abusers of shareholders' 
rights (Webb-site.com, 2001b). In Thailand, the Stock Exchange of Thailand issued a new 
rule requiring listed companies establish audit committees as a mandatory qualification 
(Zhuang, 1999). Meanwhile, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand is looking 
at the possibility of bringing in the class action lawsuit in the country's law to strengthen 
legal protection for minority shareholders (Zhuang, 1999). 
Implications for Methods 
Methodologically, the two-phase design used in this study represents an improved 
research design over the adoption of either a large sample empirical study or an in-depth case 
study as it combined a large-sample quantitative empirical study with qualitative interviews. 
This not only provided triangulation to the findings so as to avoid common source and 
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common method biases (Doty & Glick, 1998), but also expanded and enriched the existing 
theories by providing field data to support and explain the findings. 
Implications for Practice 
This study also draws implications for managers intending to invest in East Asian 
corporations. Though many of the business practices implied in this study are deeply 
ingrained in the Overseas Chinese tradition, there emerges a new generation of managers who 
are more receptive to Western business practices, and the Internet which are revolutionizing 
and rewriting the rules of game. 
The new generation of business leaders in East Asia are typically those who have 
received Western business education, often from the U.K. or the U.S. Among them are young 
entrepreneurs who established IT startups and successors of the business tycoons as well. 
These young managers whose practices are vastly different from the older generation are 
considered a new force that is revolutionizing the business practices in East Asia. Yeung 
commented: "their [the tycoons'] family successors are more outward-looking in business 
practices and opportunity-seeking" (Yeung, 1999). They proved to be more receptive to the 
corporate governance and disclosure (The Economist, 2000). 
The Internet is another force that is also revolutionalizing the way business is done in 
East Asia. Economist reported: 
[The Internet] may turn out to be the greatest of all forces bearing down on 
Confucian management practices, for three reasons. First, it undermines the 
tycoons' business models, which are based on networks of Chinese around the 
world and on privileged information. Second, it allows the rapid rise of new 
competitors. Third, Internet businesses rely to a much greater extent than old-
economy operations on equity funding by venture capitalists or market 
investors, as well as on stock options as compensation to employees, and these 
groups demand more transparency {The Economist, 2000: p. 68). 
The Internet is also assuming the role of distributing greater power to smaller shareholders 
(Allen, 2000). For instance, proxy voting of some companies in the U.S. and Europe is going 
online. Companies are also under increasing pressure to release financial information to their 
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investors and the public. As many East Asian countries are rapidly establishing information 
technology and telecommunications infrastructures to permit these systems to be 
implemented, companies have no excuse to delay disclosure online. The enormous business 
potential of the Internet and e-commerce has somehow reduced the reliance on conducting 
business through established guanxi networks. The turnaround of new economy companies 
can be vastly different from the old economy companies. 
Nevertheless, we expect changing a deeply ingrained culture such as one in East Asia 
is going to take a long time. An overnight complete alignment to Western business practices 
in East Asia is unlikely to be appropriate for many business owners and workers, who are 
exposed to an unique sets of institutions that emphasize importance of family dominance and 
guanxi building, and give unparalleled weight to establishing long-term relationship. 
Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has several limitations. The first limitation is the inability to 
discriminate between forced replacement of Chairperson/CEO and voluntary resignation. 
Readers should interpret the effect of change in Chairperson/CEO on firm performance with 
caution, as the data available did not indicate the reasons for such changes. It could be that 
they were forced to resign because they were blamed for the less than satisfactory firm 
performance, or they resign for some personal reasons, or after all they decided to retire. 
Future research can supplement the data by tracing the reasons for change in 
Chairperson/CEO from the lOK report provided by Edgar, yet only current data for recent 
years are available online. 
The second limitation that deserves comment is the short and standardized time frame 
that was forced upon the quantitative data. To facilitate and simplify the calculation, the 
decline period and recovery period were both operationalized as a two-year span, i.e. the 
observation period for all cases was five years, with the initial year as baseline for 
comparison. The actual timetable of a turnaround, however, is idiosyncratic to that particular 
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company. In many cases, the decline and/or the recovery actually took shorter or much longer 
than two years. The snapshot measures of the dependent and independent variables over the 
standard time period may not accurately reflect the turnaround picture. 
The third limitation that deserves comment is that this study neither controls for the 
changes in the broader economic and regulatory environment nor monitors events exogenous 
to the firms. This demands a thorough study of the economic situation, general business 
climate, industry environment, and competitive landscape of each firm in the sample over 
twenty years which calls for extensive collaboration of multiple researchers and intense 
research efforts that are clearly out of the boundary of this research. 
The fourth imitation is that this study does not control for causes of decline. Past 
research suggested that there exist two distinct causes of decline: internal and external. 
Different types of causes may have possible impact on the choice of turnaround strategy. This 
again requires extensive media research to identify the causes for each firm's downturn, 
which is out of the scope of this research. Altman's (1968, 1982) Z scores predicting the 
imminence of bankruptcy can be used to measure the magnitude of decline. In the current 
study, Altman's (1968, 1982) Z scores were employed as an additional sample selection 
criterion to identify turnaround firms that not only face an extended period of decline but also 
are at risk of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968; Slatter, 1984). These regression results were 
presented in Appendix 3. 
The fifth limitation is that it failed to empirically resolve the causal relationship 
between turnaround strategies and subsequent outcomes because this study is correlational. 
However, this limitation is present in many kinds of research. The interviews partly help to 
flesh out some causal relationships with the assistance of experienced managers who were 
actually responsible for turning their company around. 
A final concern is the use of archival financial data to analyze turnaround in the 
quantitative study. Given management discretion as to accounting policies, a great deal of 
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care must be exercised when assessing financial performance (Schilit, 1993). Some issues are 
pervasive and cut across all industries; others are industry-specific. For example, when 
different inventory valuation and/or depreciation methods are used, comparability for a firm 
over time and among companies at a given point in time may be lacking, especially for 
capital-intensive companies. Archival accounting measures may be biased by a firm's choice 
of accounting practices (Dyl, 1989), and events exogenous to a firm may affect market-based 
performance measures (Gomez-Mejla & Balkin, 1992). To illustrate, the restructuring of 
hidden assets might not be reflected in the balance sheet. To correct this problem, interviews 
that helped to explain the empirical findings were conducted to supplement the quantitative 
study. Also, the inclusion of only listed companies in this study ensured that the financial 
• 26 
data were considerably accurate, though this resulted in relatively large firms. 
Turnaround in East Asia will continue to be a fascinating area that can inform 
management practices. In addition to Hong Kong and Singapore, future research can expand 
the study to other East Asian countries with large Overseas Chinese populations, for example, 
Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Burma etc. These research sites provide further 
evidence on the applicability of the extant turnaround theories to East Asian contexts. 
Finally, this study does not have measures for the institutional environment. Future 
research can use institutional profile to measure the contextual factors (Busenitz, Gomez & 
Spencer, 2000) affecting turnaround actions and correlated it with turnaround outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Although the Asian economic crisis imposed a severe blow to the economic 
prosperity of the East Asian region, signs were emerging that many firms were broadly 
recovering. With many of the East Asian firms recovering, their business activities are 
assuming more significance in the world economy. Understanding how firms operate in this 
26 To test the effects of firm size on turnaround actions and success, the sample were divided into large and 
small firms and by region. Separate regressions were run and the results were presented in Appendix 4. 
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distinctive environment needs to be enhanced. By hypothesizing the various differences of 
turnaround strategies and subsequent outcomes between the East Asian and U.S. firms, this 
thesis attempts to draw implications for hundreds or even thousands of firms that are facing 
the challenges of turnaround in East Asia and implications for turnaround theory. 
Turnaround actions are very much shaped by the cultural and institutional 
environment where they take place. Turnaround theories developed in the Western countries 
may be limited in their applicability to the rest of the world. Hofstede (1993) points out the 
cultural constraints present in American-made management theories. This study illustrates 
that some turnaround actions in East Asia are obviously beyond the explanatory power of 
existing theories, and that further theoretical development demands disciplined imagination 
(Weick, 1989) and careful analysis. 
In a nutshell, many turnaround actions in East Asia are similar to those in the U.S., 
but important differences that exist can be explained from the institutional perspective, and 
firms must be responsive to the unique institutional environment in which they find 
themselves in devising turnaround plans. Specifically, evidence found in this thesis suggests 
unlike Western firms which consider replacing the top management team an indispensable 
part in effecting turnaround, making such management changes proved much more difficult 
to happen and occasionally detrimental to firms' success in East Asia. Reduction in fixed 
assets, while a crucial component in Western turnaround, is far less pronounced by owners in 
East Asia who consider these assets their family jewels. Cutting accounts receivable is also a 
less viable option since firms are in favor of maintaining important guanxi with key 
customers rather than short-term quick fix. While generating more revenues is of equal 
importance in turning a firm around in both the U.S. and East Asia, the capacity to do so is 
more limited among East Asian firms as they have less available funds. This is in part due to 
their smaller firm size and thus tighter advertising and promotion budget for allocation. 
Reducing debt is also more difficult to carry out as the banking systems in East Asia allow 
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firms to borrow from a prodigious number of banks and the facilities to reduce debt such as 
debt-for-equity swap is less common a workout plan in this region. The corporate debt 
markets are generally underdeveloped in most East Asian countries (Ang et al, 2000). From 
the above evidence, this is clear that these conventional turnaround actions in the West ~ 
while broadly used by many U.S. firms -- assume less importance in turning firms around in 
East Asia. 
Apart from those differences, there are a few similarities between turnaround in East 
Asia and the West that deserve attention. The role of strategic human resources management 
to improve productivity and profitability is emphasized in both regions. Interview data show 
that East Asian firms, alike their Western counterparts, were cautious in making changes in 
human resources management. They made changes in compensation but with an eye toward 
carefully managing layoffs, changes in supplies and so forth, which are consistent with the 
ingrained notion of maintaining important guanxi networks. East Asian firms are trying hard 
to trim the remuneration packages to reduce costs. For instance, the thirteenth-month salary, 
which has been considered sacrosanct in Chinese communities, is challenged. Firms are also 
using Internet strategies to their advantage as an indirect turnaround action to streamline 
operations and cut costs. 
In the aftermath, the Asian economic crisis was increasingly seen as more typical of a 
general banking and currency crisis, but the inherent structural weaknesses of corporations in 
the region were also attributed to the deep downturn (Ang et al., 2000). Building shareholder 
value by improving corporate governance and transparency will be among the firms' top 
agenda for those who are serious about restoring investor's confidence after the crisis. A 
bottom-up recovery that is driven by increased efficiency and competitiveness of firms from 
corporate and institutional restructuring is likely to be one that is more robust and sustainable 
in the long term (Ang et al., 2000). This suggests that company turnaround and restructuring 
will remain an important topic for East Asian managers for many years to come. The 
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recollections of the lessons learned from the Asian financial crisis and turnaround will help to 
lay the foundations for long-term success; those who ignore the lessons risk revisiting many 
of the same problems in the future (cf. Rohwer, 2001). 
To conclude, business downturn in East Asia calls for firms, banks and investors to be 
more circumspect of the institutional constraints characterizing the business environment in 
this region. The notion that "one size does not fit all” holds true, meaning imposing the 
Western turnaround model on East Asian firms without discernment is fraught with difficulty. 
Firms that are successful in turnaround tend to remember the legitimacy concerns of 
controlling families and are sensitive to the local environment along with being cognizant of 
shareholders' concerns. All of these stakeholders and concerns must be addressed; none can 
be taken lightly in undertaking and assisting with firm turnaround in East Asia. 
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1. How difficult was the performance decline for your firm? 
2. What are the causes for the downturn? 
3. What actions did your firm take in response to the performance decline and how did it 
manage the turnaround process? 
4. What are the differences you see between turnarounds in Asia and those in the West? 
5. Are these differences unique to Hong Kong or do you believe they are the same across 
Asia? 
6. It is argued that not all firms need to retrench (or what is commonly called stopping the 
bleeding) first before they start their turnaround effort. What are your beliefs? 
7. In the West they commonly discuss that strategic solution should be utilized for strategic 
problems and that operating solutions should be utilized for operating problems. Do you 
see a similar scenario in Asia? 
8. Changes in senior management are often prescribed in the West for successful turnaround 
efforts. Is this also associated with successful turnaround in Asia? 
9. How are such senior manager changes impacted by the closely held nature of even 
publicly traded firms in Asia? 
10. Firm diversification is frequently criticized in the West and turnaround firms are 
encouraged to focus. But firms in Asia tended to be much more diversified than do the 
Western firms. How does this impact the turnaround efforts? 
11. How does diversification into China impact the turnaround efforts? 
12. At what stage do firms (banks) typically call in a turnaround expert and why do they call 
them in? 
13. In the West it is thought how quickly a firm begins its turnaround effort and the size of 
the firm (the larger the better) leads to greater turnaround success. Is this true in Asia? 
14. Did you use localization of workforce in your turnaround efforts as a way to reduce cost, 
thus increase revenue? Any advice for future research needs on firm decline and 
turnaround in Asia? 
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APPENDIX 2 
ANALYSIS OF FIRMS WITH NON-ETHNIC CHINESE PRINCIPALS 
REMOVED 
In spite of the fact that all the companies included in the Asian sample were listed 
either in the Hong Kong or Singapore stock exchanges, one concern arises that a handful of 
these firms are dominated by non-Chinese management. 
Therefore, I traced the top management of these companies, and removed those firms 
that were headed by non-ethnic Chinese Chairperson or CEO/Managing Director to clean up 
the data. Eleven firms were removed from the Hong Kong sample and eighteen firms from 
the Singapore sample. This produces a sub sample of 290 firms. Table 14 presents the results. 
The regression results did not change significantly (Model 2: R^ = .29, p < .001), though one 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ANALYSIS OF FIRMS WITH LOW Z-SCORES 
Past research indicates that situation severity has implications for turnaround actions 
and ultimate turnaround success (Hofer, 1980; Robbins & Pearce, 1992) -- the more severe 
the decline situation, the more drastic the actions should be undertaken. Altman's (1968, 
1982) Z score is the most commonly used measure to operationalize situation severity 
(Robbins & Pearce, 1992) in financial terms. A Z score is a function of five financial ratios 
with. Linear discriminant analysis was run to distinguish between solvent firms and insolvent 
ones. A Z score of less than 2.675 has been cited as a critical value to discriminate those 
likely to go bankrupt from others (Altman, 1968). 
Two additional regression models were run using the same dependent and 
independent variables, but with Z scores as an additional selection criterion to identify firms 
not only face decline but also are at risk of bankruptcy that need immediate turnaround 
attempts. First, the sample was split into two by using the critical value as the cutoff point: 
firms with Z scores in the last year of the two-year decline period above the critical value 
were labeled solvent firms; firms with Z scores below the critical value insolvent firms. 
Separate regression analyses were run and the results showed that the predicting power of the 
model is stronger for insolvent firms than for solvent firms (Table 15: Insolent firms: R“ = 57, 
p < .001; Solvent firms: ^ = .06, p = .92). This is consistent with past research findings that 
firms in deep downturn need more drastic actions, usually operational turnaround actions, to 
rescue it from failure than their peers. 
Second, regression models were run using only low Z score firms from the sample (Z 
< 2.675 in year 2). This represents a stricter sample selection criterion. Table 16 presents the 
• • 2 results. The regression results improved significantly from the originally ones (Model 9: R = 
.58,j9<.05). 
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Table 15. Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis: Solvent Versus Insolvent firms ^ 
Solvent Firms ^ Insolvent Firms 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant l l Ts m 
Step 1: Control variables 
Firm size -.02 -.02 .03** .00 
Services .02 .03 .02 -.00 
Finance .04 .01 .19*** .15*** 
Utilities .07 .11 -.02 -.01 
Conglomerate -.13 -.12 .11* .06* 
Region e -.08 -.07 -.02 -.07卞 
Step 2: Independent variables 
Change in Chairperson/CEO .02 -.00 
Percentage change in net fixed .00 .01 * 
assets 
Percentage change in receivables .03 .01 
Percentage change in sales -.05 -.06*** 
Percentage change in debt -.00 .01 
M^ .05 .02 .11 .46 
AF .70 .28 4.08** 43.71*** 
.05 .06 .11 .57 
Adjusted r2 ^ ^ ^ .55 
a Unstandardized coefficients (betas) are reported. For solvent firms, n = 92; for insolvent 
firms,>7 = 216. 
b For solvent firms, the Z scores in the second year were above 2.675, i.e., the critical 
value; for insolvent firms, the Z scores were below 2.675. 
e Coding: 0 = North American firms, 1 = East Asian firms, 
t p<AO 
* ；? < . 0 5 
* * p<m 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ANALYSIS OF FIRM SIZE 
Some researchers argue that firm size and region in which the firm locates can have 
influence on turnaround actions and turnaround success. Firm size was measured by the 
natural logarithm of the corporation's total assets in the baseline year -- the year prior to the 
two-year decline period. The median firm size of the current sample was US $ 152.07 million 
of total assets. To examine those effects, the sample was then split into four sub samples by 
region and by firm size. This creates a two-by-two matrix: U.S. large firms, U.S. small firms, 
Asian large firms, and Asian small firms. Since those U.S. firms in the current sample were 
relatively large compared to those Asian firms, there is only one U.S. firm that was below the 
median firm size. Therefore, the U.S.-small-firm category was omitted in the analysis. 
Separate regression analyses were run and the results are presented in Table 17. The model 
for Asian small firms was significant (Model 8: R^ = .30,/? < .001). The models for U.S. large 
firms and Asian large firms turned out to be insignificant. However, no U.S. small firms were 
included in the analysis, no conclusion can be drawn whether this model has more 
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